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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a nuanced perspective on debates about the potential for 
Africa’s smallholder agriculture to stimulate growth and alleviate poverty in an 
increasingly integrated world. In particular, the paper synthesizes both the traditional 
theoretical literature on agriculture’s role in the development process and discusses more 
recent literature that remains skeptical about agriculture’s development potential for 
Africa. In order to examine in greater detail the relevance for Africa of both the “old” and 
“new” literatures on agriculture, the paper provides a typology of African countries based 
on their stage of development, agricultural conditions, natural resources, and geographic 
location.  This typology shows that agriculture’s growth and poverty-reduction potential 
varies substantially across the continent.  Moreover, the typology provides the framework 
for in-depth analysis of agriculture and growth-poverty linkages in five countries 
(Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia) using economy-wide, macro-micro 
linkage models. 
The paper shows that despite recent skepticism, agricultural growth is still 
important for most low-income African countries. The country level analyses emphasize 
that agriculture is especially important for poverty reduction. In particular, broad-based 
agricultural growth in the staple food sectors reduces poverty more than growth driven by 
agricultural exports, which often bypasses small farms.  
More broadly, the paper demonstrates that conventional theory on the role of 
agriculture in the early stage of development remains relevant to Africa. While the 
continent does face new and different challenges than those encountered by Asian and 
Latin American countries during their successful transformations, most African countries 
cannot significantly reduce poverty, increase per capita incomes, and transform into 
modern economies without focusing on agricultural development.  vii
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A majority of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population live in rural areas where poverty and 
deprivation are most severe. Since almost all rural households depend directly or indirectly on 
agriculture, and given the large contribution of this sector to the overall economy, it might 
seem obvious that agriculture should be a key component of growth and development. 
However, although agriculture-led growth played an important role in slashing poverty and 
transforming the economies of many Asian and Latin American countries, the strategy has not 
yet worked in Africa.
2 Most African countries have not yet met the requirements for a 
successful agricultural revolution, and factor productivity in African agriculture seriously lags 
behind the rest of the world. This has led to growing skepticism in the international 
development community about agriculture’s relevance to growth and poverty reduction. This 
paper suggests that the ‘agro-pessimism’ not only is unwarranted but also undermines attempts 
to accelerate growth and poverty reduction. While parts of Africa are indeed disadvantaged by 
unfavorable natural and geographic conditions, agriculture’s poor performance has often been 
due to underinvestment in physical, institutional, and human capital, as well as by attempts to 
bypass agriculture through isolated industrialization, often at the cost of agricultural stagnation 
and worsening poverty.   
The aim of this paper is to examine whether the conventional wisdom on agriculture’s 
role in the development process is applicable to the contemporary circumstances faced by a 
number of African countries.  In particular, Section II of this paper analyzes how the perceived 
role of agriculture in development has evolved over the last half-century. It finds theoretical 
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2 ‘Africa’ here refers to ‘Sub-Saharan Africa,’ the regional focus of this paper.   2
and empirical justification for why agricultural growth has powerful leverage effects on the 
rest of the economy, especially in the early stages of economic transformation when it 
accounts for large shares of national income, employment and exports. Through its linkages to 
the rest of the economy, agriculture can generate patterns of development that are 
employment-intensive and favorable for the poor. While there is a clear understanding of the 
conditions under which agriculture-led growth is most likely to succeed, many of these 
conditions either do not yet exist in Africa or need to improve further.  However, the huge 
challenges facing African agriculture cannot be used as a justification for its neglect.  Indeed, 
Section II highlights that little evidence or theory exists to suggest that Africa can bypass an 
agricultural revolution if the region is to substantially increase growth and reduce poverty. 
Yet, while agriculture is generally an important component for Africa’s development, 
its ability to generate growth and reduce poverty varies across and within countries, as well as 
across different agricultural subsectors.  Accordingly, Section III presents a typology of 
African countries classified according to the potential for agriculture to contribute to their 
growth.  This typology is supplemented with in-depth case studies that examine the 
agriculture, growth, and poverty dynamics in Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia. 
These case studies all highlight that broad-based agricultural growth, particularly in 
conjunction with growth in the nonagricultural sector, could contribute significantly to growth 
and poverty reduction. Within agriculture, the food staples subsector can offer the most 
poverty reduction in the five countries, particularly in the poorest subregions of the countries. 
Although important achievements have occurred in these countries, generating further 
agricultural growth to transform their economies will require meeting a number of conditions, 
such as increased investments in technology, infrastructure, markets and health, and improved 
governance.  These and other conclusions are included in Section IV of the paper. 
   3
II.  AGRICULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND 
CURRENT DEBATE 
Agriculture’s Role in Early Development Thinking 
Since agriculture constitutes a large share of national output and often employs a 
majority of the labor force in most developing countries, the sector is integral to any thinking 
about development.
3 However, the perceived role of agriculture in growth and development 
has changed considerably over the last half-century. Early classical theory viewed economic 
development as a growth process requiring the systematic reallocation of factors of production 
from a primary sector characterized by low productivity, traditional technology, and 
decreasing returns to a modern industrial sector with higher productivity and increasing 
returns (Adelman 2001). Agriculture was seen as a low-productivity, traditional sector that 
only passively contributed to development by providing food and employment. Furthermore, 
agriculture’s importance was expected to decline as development advanced. Nevertheless, 
agricultural growth was still considered necessary for development and for a country’s 
transformation from a traditional to a modern economy.   
Two key characteristics of agriculture during the early stages of development justified 
its place in early development thinking. First, agriculture produces goods that directly satisfy 
basic human needs. Second, agricultural production combines human effort with natural 
resources, such as land and agroecological assets. Since natural resources were assumed to be 
freely available, early development theorists believed that agriculture could grow 
independently of other economic activities. However, in reality, agriculture’s dependence on a 
fixed supply of land meant that its expansion was constrained. This implied that agricultural 
output cannot proportionally increase with increased labor supply under a given technology 
(that is, agriculture suffers from diminishing returns). On the demand side, the need to satisfy 
basic needs implied that, at the very least, agricultural growth must match population growth 
in order to avoid the Malthusian trap and stagnant development. 
                                                 
3 Agriculture accounts for over 30 percent of GDP and 60 percent of total employment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(excluding South Africa).    4
The need for agricultural growth during the early stages of development has also been 
examined in recent neoclassical literature. For example, Yang and Zhu (2004) use growth 
theory to capture the intertemporal dynamics of the development process. The authors 
demonstrate that, without agricultural productivity, a traditional economy cannot overcome the 
fixed supply of natural resources and thus, cannot generate sustained economic growth.   
Regardless of how fast the nonagricultural sector grows, stagnant agricultural production 
during the early stages of development prevents the structural transformation from a 
traditional to a modern economy. 
Classical theorists observed that most developing countries are comprised of ‘dual’ 
economies.  In this view, labor productivity is typically lower in agriculture than in industry, 
and hence development requires the movement of agricultural labor into nonagriculture. While 
nonagricultural innovation and technological change can occur independently of the 
agricultural sector, both labor and savings must be released from agriculture in order to satisfy 
labor demand and finance capital investment in industry. This explains “why industrial and 
agrarian revolutions always go together and why economies in which agriculture is stagnant 
do not show industrial development” (Lewis 1954, 433).
4 Furthermore, the fact that demand 
for agricultural goods does not keep pace with per capita income growth (Engel’s Law) 
implies that agricultural surpluses can be generated as long as agricultural productivity growth 
exceeds the population growth rate.  
Beyond agriculture providing a ‘reserve army’ of labor, classical economists also 
highlighted the importance of food supplies in stimulating economic growth. If traditional 
agriculture remains stagnant, then increased employment in the nonagricultural sector may 
result in food shortages. Food price increases would raise the cost of living, especially for low-
income households with high food consumption shares (that is, large Engel coefficients).
5 The 
pressure to raise wages would hamper industrial growth, especially during the early stages of 
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development when technologies are typically labor-intensive. Increased labor costs eventually 
drive the economy into a ‘stationary state’ without further growth (see Box 1). This is the 
famous ‘Ricardian trap’ (Ricardo 1817), which formed the foundation for subsequent 
development theorists (Schultz 1953; Lewis 1954; Fei and Ranis 1961 and 1964; and 
Jorgenson 1961). According to Hayami (2001, 84), these theorists understood that “successful 
industrialization cannot be expected without the parallel effort of increasing food production 
to avoid the danger of being caught in the Ricardian trap.”  
While early development economists saw agricultural growth as an essential 
component and even a precondition for growth in the rest of economy, the process by which 
this growth was generated remained beyond the concern of most development economists 
(Ruttan 2002). For this reason, Lewis’s theory was employed to support the industrialization 
strategies adopted by many developing countries during the 1950 to 1970s. However, as will 
be discussed later, the ‘urban-bias’ generated by these attempts at industrialization revealed 
that agricultural and nonagricultural growth could not occur independently of each other. 
Box 1.  Food Availability Can Become a Constraint for Economic Growth 
 
Latin American countries experienced rapid industrialization during the 1950s to 
1970s. Agricultural growth barely matched rising food demand caused by high population 
growth and urbanization. Industrial growth rose to 8 percent per year between 1965 and 1973, 
while per capita agricultural production stagnated and even fell in five countries. As a result, 
food imports increased from an annual growth rate of 3.1 percent during 1950s to more than 
12 percent in the early 1970s. With a rise in world prices for grains, food imports led to 
substantial strains on the balance of trade and the exchange rate and led to inflationary 
pressures (de Janvry 1981). 
 
Agriculture’s Active Role in Growth and Development 
The passive view of agriculture’s role was swept aside by the dynamism of the Green 
Revolution in Asia during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The transformation of traditional 
agriculture into a modern sector revealed agriculture’s potential as a growth sector (see Box 
2).   Simultaneously, it highlighted that science-based technology adapted to a country’s 
ecological conditions is key for agricultural growth.  Indeed, advances in mechanical and 
biological technology can help overcome endowment constraints, particularly with in regard to   6
land and labor.   Based on this idea, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) espoused an “induced 
innovation model” that not only emphasized the importance of technical change for 
agricultural growth but also stressed that technical change is often endogenous to a country’s 
economic system.  In other words, successful agricultural innovation is a dynamic process that 
reflects natural endowments, the degree of demand and supply for agricultural inputs and 
outputs, and the incentive structure for farmers, scientists, and the public and private sectors.  
As both the Green Revolution and the “induced innovation model” revealed, agricultural 
productivity growth requires fostering the linkages between the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors.   
The importance of intersectoral linkages in driving the growth process had already 
been widely recognized. Hirschman (1958) was one of the first theorists to emphasize linkage-
effects in the growth process, although his analysis focused mainly on the backward and 
forward linkages created by investments in industrial sectors. By contrast, Johnson and Mellor 
(1961) emphasized the existence of production and consumption linkages, both within 
agriculture as well as between agriculture and nonagriculture.  In particular, agricultural 
production generates forward linkages such that agricultural outputs are supplied as inputs into 
nonagricultural production. Growth in agriculture contributes to rapid rises in agroprocessing 
and processed food marketing, which not only provides new engines of growth but an 
opportunity to substitute for imports. Agriculture also creates backward production linkages 
through its demand for intermediate inputs such as fertilizers and marketing services. Both of 
these production linkages are likely to deepen as an economy modernizes, but decline in 
relative importance alongside agriculture’s share of production (Haggblade et al. 1989). 
Box 2.  Agriculture Explains More Than Half of GDP Growth Between 1960 and 1990 
 
Work by Gollin et al. (2002) shows the importance of agriculture in the early stages of 
development. Using both cross section and panel data for 62 developing countries for the 
period 1960 to 1990, the authors find that growth in agricultural productivity is quantitatively 
important in explaining growth in GDP per worker. This direct contribution accounts for 54 
percent of GDP growth. Furthermore, countries experiencing increases in agricultural 
productivity are able to release labor from agriculture into other sectors of the economy. This   7
sectoral shift accounts for a further 29 percent of GDP growth. The remaining 17 percent is 
derived from nonagricultural growth. 
 
The consumption linkage generated by increased rural incomes is agriculture’s most 
important linkage in the development process (see Box 3). Rural households, especially during 
the early stages of development, provide an important market for domestically-produced 
manufactures and services (Hazell and Roell 1983). Without this market, it is unlikely that 
sufficient export opportunities will allow fledgling domestic industries to achieve competitive 
efficiency in foreign markets through economies-of-scale. Surplus agricultural income 
provides savings for investment in both urban and rural areas (Hart 1998). This savings 
linkage also works through forward linkages to urban areas. Lower food prices, stimulated by 
technological change in agriculture, maintain low real wages in industrial sectors and thus 
foster investment and structural transformation. 
In an open economy, sectoral linkages are influenced by foreign trade. The magnitude 
of the linkage effects depends on the existence of nontradable sectors and on imperfect 
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.  For example, Fei and Ranis’s (1961) 
assertion that urban growth demands agricultural growth may be less binding if imports can 
substitute for domestic agriculture.  Nonetheless, agricultural  
Box 3.  Agricultural Linkages Change Across Different Stages of Development 
 
Using social accounting matrices for 27 countries, Vogel (1994) examines the strength 
of the linkages between agriculture and the rest of the economy at different development 
stages. The author found that backward linkages are typically strong at early stages, while the 
forward linkages are much weaker. Demand created by rising rural incomes represented 
almost 70 percent of the backward linkages. At later stages of development the forward 
linkage strengthens due to a greater and more complex integration of agricultural production 
with other sectors. 
 
growth has stronger links to the rest of the economy than nonagriculture (especially industry) 
because (i) agricultural output is typically sold in domestic markets, (ii) intermediate inputs 
into agricultural production are less import-intensive than industrial production, and (iii) rural   8
demand is usually met by domestically-produced goods. On the other hand, urban 
consumption patterns tend to favor imported goods that not only weaken industrial backward 
linkages but also lead to foreign exchange constraints that hamper capital-intensive 
industrialization. Admittedly, export-oriented agriculture can undermine forward-linkages and 
agricultural production can be constrained by the lack of growth in nonagricultural incomes in 
both urban and rural areas. Therefore, foreign trade can dampen agriculture’s linkage-effects, 
especially in smaller and more open economies.  
The role of agriculture in rural, as opposed to national, development was the focus for 
many agricultural economists during the 1980s and 1990s (Hazell and Haggblade 1982, 1991; 
Hazell and Roell 1983). This shift in emphasis was motivated by (i) imperfect or missing 
commodity and factor markets; (ii) rigidities in rural-urban factor mobility; (iii) high transport 
costs; (iv) the existence of rural nontradable sectors; and (v) rural unemployment and 
underemployment. It was suggested that agricultural productivity growth stimulates rural 
economies through production and consumption linkages at the regional level. Labor demand 
between agriculture and rural nonfarm activities can create further rural-linkage effects, and 
reciprocal reverse flows from rural nonfarm activities can help finance the purchase of 
agricultural inputs, which further improves productivity (Reardon et al. 1994; Barrett et al. 
2003). Virtually all these studies emphasized the importance of infrastructure in improving the 
responsiveness of the nonfarm economy to increases in demand from agriculture (Barnes and 
Binswanger 1986; Ahmed 1987; Evans 1990; Hazell and Haggblade 1991; Ahmed and 
Donovan 1992; Fan and Hazell 1998). Finally, some region-focused studies also considered 
the formation of social capital, suggesting that increased interactions between farmers, input 
suppliers, processors and banks might help generate the confidence and trust needed to initiate 
nonagricultural business and commercial agriculture (Irz et al. 2001). 
The growth linkage effects emanating from agricultural growth have proved most 
powerful when agricultural growth is driven by small farms, which dominate the rural 
economy and agriculture in most Asian and African countries. An impressive body of 
empirical studies has demonstrated that small farms are highly efficient due to their greater   9
land productivity and their provision of self-supervising labor (for example., Eastwood et al. 
2004, Hazell 2004). Small farms help contain poverty by providing an affordable platform 
from which poor households can experiment with ways to improve their livelihoods, and help 
prevent premature urban migration and the explosive growth of large cities. Furthermore, 
small- to medium-sized farm households typically have more favorable expenditure patterns 
for promoting growth of the local nonfarm economy, including rural towns. They spend higher 
shares of incremental income on rural nontraded goods than large-scale farmers, thereby 
generating greater demand for labor-intensive goods and services produced locally (Mellor 
1976; Hazell and Roell 1983). Crucially, small farms also ensure a degree of food security in 
rural areas where high transport and marketing costs can drive up food prices, while at the 
national level, the higher land productivity of small farms has the potential to greatly help poor 
countries attain self-sufficiency in staples such as cereals, roots and tubers, and even livestock. 
The strong linkage effects of agricultural growth suggest that the sector could lead to 
broader economic growth in some countries, even open economies, during the early stages of 
industrialization. Singer (1979) described a ‘balanced-growth’ strategy as one in which 
“national development of agriculture as the primary sector and developing industries with 
strong emphasis on agriculture-industry linkages and interactions.” (Singer 1979, 27) The 
balanced-growth strategy was later relabeled as an agricultural-demand-led-industrialization 
(ADLI) strategy (Adelman 1984). The ADLI strategy stressed that increasing agricultural 
productivity expanded internal demand for intermediate and consumer goods produced by 
domestic industry and, in turn, helped support the drive towards industrialization. Such 
agricultural growth was geared towards increasing the incomes of the poorest members of 
society through increasing the supply of wage goods. By contrast, urban-biased 
industrialization was often characterized by highly dualistic development patterns, 
deteriorating distributions of income, and slowing growth in both agricultural production and 
the national economy. (Adelman 1984, 938). Adelman also emphasized the distributional 
impact of agricultural growth. A critical determinant for broad-based participation in the 
growth process is an equitable ownership of productive assets, especially land, during the 
earliest stages of development. Thus, the emphasis in policy toward agriculture should shift   10
“from surplus extraction to surplus creation and to the generation of demand linkages with the 
rest of economy.” (Adelman, 1984, 939)  
Theory has recently moved beyond the direct sectoral linkages described above. 
Recent studies have shown a positive link between nutrition and economic growth. Inadequate 
and irregular access to food increases malnutrition, reduces labor productivity and is 
tantamount to a disinvestment in human capital (Bliss and Stern 1978; Strauss 1986; Fogel 
1994; Williamson 1993). For example, Nadav (1996) examined the importance of nutritional 
capital by extending Solow’s growth model. Drawing on a sample of 97 countries, the author 
finds that nutritional levels have a large and highly significant impact on economic growth 
(see Box 4). This is consistent with Fogel (1991), who found that increased caloric intake 
reduced mortality and raised productivity amongst the working poor during the early stages of 
Western Europe’s development. He concluded that “…bringing the ultra-poor into the labor 
force and raising the energy available for work by those in the labor force explains about 30 
percent of the British growth in per capita incomes over the past two centuries.” (Fogel 1991, 
63)  
Agriculture also affects economic growth through its potential to stabilize domestic 
food production and thereby enhance food security. Periodic food crises undermine both 
political and economic stability, thereby reducing the level and efficiency of investment 
(Alesina and Perotti 1993; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Dawe 1996; Timmer 1989, 1996). 
While food imports may temporarily alleviate such crises, they are not a viable solution for 
ensuring long-term food security, especially given the possibility of encountering foreign 
exchange constraints.  
Box 4.  Nutrition is a Key Determinant of Growth 
 
Arcand (2001) shows that the link between nutrition and economic growth is robust to 
the use of different data sets and different econometric techniques, ranging from OLS to 
GMM. Using three different cross-country data sets, the author finds that nutrition affects 
growth directly, through labor productivity, and indirectly, through improvements in life 
expectancy. Increasing per capita consumption of dietary energy supply to 2770 kcal/day in 
countries, which are below this, would directly increase growth by 0.53 percentage points and   11
indirectly by 0.70 percentage points. Depending on the method and data used, the study finds 
that inadequate nutrition reduces the growth rate of GDP per capita by about 0.20 to 4.7 
percentage points. For Sub-Saharan Africa, it accounts for between 0.16 and 4.0 percentage 
points.  
 
Urban-bias in public policies has distorted investment incentives and created strikingly 
different marginal productivities of capital in urban and rural areas (Fan et al. 2004). Timmer 
(2004) suggests that correcting such distortions would shift the overall rate of return to capital 
and improve the efficiency of resource allocation, thereby increasing factor productivity.   
Consequently, altering investment towards stimulating agricultural growth also contributes to 
the generation of broader economic growth. 
In addition, the unique decision-making processes associated with agriculture, 
especially smallholder agriculture, can stimulate broader growth by fostering the processes of 
learning and innovation (Timmer 1988). Specifically, achieving high yields depends on both 
hard work and management skills, especially the ability to adopt new technologies. 
Abramowitz (1986) attributed the ability to adopt productive technologies and operate markets 
to ‘social capability’ and found that the initial level of social capability explained intercountry 
differences in the trajectories pursued by different industrializing European countries.
6 
Likewise, Temple and Johnson (1996) proxy for social capability using the Adelman-Morris 
index of socioeconomic development.  By controlling for income per capita, the authors show 
that countries with higher average economic growth rates between 1960 and 1985 had higher 
levels of initial social capability in 1960.  In order to fully mobilize a country’s social 
capability during the early stages of development, it is important to acknowledge smallholder 
farmers’ entrepreneurial potential and accordingly develop technologies that improve their 
management capabilities. In turn, these rural entrepreneurs can help drive nonagricultural 
growth in both rural and urban areas.   
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Agricultural Growth Reduces Poverty 
Given its size and composition, agriculture is important not only for generating growth 
but also for reducing poverty and inequality. As noted by Atkinson (1997), there is no unified 
theory of income distribution. Rather the empirical debate has revolved around the Kuznets 
(1955) hypothesis, which predicts that income inequality first rises and then falls with 
economic development. Kuznets based his speculation on longitudinal data on the industrial 
countries’ development histories. Subsequent cross-country estimations have generally 
supported this hypothesis. However, recent and more sophisticated country-level analyses find 
no evidence of a systematic link between inequality and the rate of growth (Mellor 1999; 
Kanbur and Squire 2001). Lopez (2004), for example, in his cross-country estimation that 
explicitly accounts for countries’ initial conditions finds that growth is most important for 
poverty-reduction during the earliest stages of development that is, at low income levels). 
However, the author’s analysis suggests that inequality increasingly becomes a constraint to 
poverty-reduction at higher stages of development. 
Most studies show that growth has a significant impact on poverty reduction, but there 
is substantial variation in the literature about the extent to which poverty declines (Dollar and 
Kraay 2002). This variation highlights the importance of understanding the structure of growth 
and its relationship with poverty. Linking sectoral growth and poverty-reduction has become a 
focus in the literature (Mellor 1999). There is a large econometric literature from the late 
1990s onwards that uses cross-country or time-series data to estimate sectoral and subsectoral 
growth-poverty elasticities (for example, Timmer 1997; Ravallion and Datt 1999). 
Agricultural growth, as opposed to growth in general, is typically shown to be the primary 
sector reducing poverty. Nonagricultural growth is found to have a greater impact on overall 
growth since these sectors have typically grown faster than agriculture.
7 However, in the early 
stages of development these high nonagricultural growth rates have typically been achieved 
only when agriculture is also growing rapidly. This is because the resources used for 
agricultural growth are only marginally competitive with other sectors, thus, fast agricultural 
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growth tends to be additive to growth in other sectors and is a stimulant of growth in the labor-
intensive nontradable sectors (Mellor 1966 and 1976). Therefore, not only does agricultural 
growth favor the poor, but it also does not undermine the poverty-reducing effects of other 
sectors (see Box 5).  
The strong poverty-reducing effect of agricultural growth is due in part to its 
generation of both agricultural and nonagricultural employment. As mentioned above, 
agriculture is by far the largest employer in developing countries where over half the labor 
force is typically directly engaged in agriculture. This is especially true in labor-abundant 
economies where small-farm households often account for large shares of the rural and total 
poor. A key relationship between growth in agriculture and poverty is that agricultural growth 
directly generates demand for rural labor. Increasing agricultural productivity, especially in 
countries facing land constraints, requires the intensification of farming systems through yield-
enhancing technologies. While such technologies raise labor productivity, they also require 
additional labor as well as modern intermediate inputs.  Hayami and Ruttan (1985) reviewed 
the literature on the effect of modern varieties of rice and wheat in Asia and concluded that 
their introduction typically resulted in an increase in labor requirements per unit of land for 
each crop, as well as an increase in the number of crops grown (cropping intensity) per year. 
Box 5.  Growth in Agriculture Benefits the Poor in both Rural and Urban Areas 
 
Using panel data from India for 1951 to 1990, Ravallion and Datt (1996) found strong 
evidence that the urban-rural composition of growth matters to poverty reduction. While urban 
growth reduced urban poverty, its effect was not significantly different from zero in explaining 
the rate of poverty reduction nationally. On the other hand, rural growth reduced poverty in 
rural and urban areas and hence had a significant, positive effect on national poverty 
reduction. 
 
By disaggregating different types of households in a 1980 Social Accounting Matrix 
for Indonesia, Thorbecke and Jung (1996) were able to decompose growth-linkages into 
distributional and interdependency effects. The distributional effects are in turn further broken 
down into intersectional, direct-distributional, and interhousehold transfer linkages. They 
found that the agricultural sector contributes the most to overall poverty alleviation, followed 
by the services and informal sectors. The manufacturing sector as a whole contributes the least 
to poverty alleviation, although the food processing and textiles subsectors within   14
manufacturing made relatively large contributions to poverty alleviation by employing 
unskilled workers. 
 
Using data for 1985 to 1996 for China, Fan et al. (2005) estimated an econometric 
model to measure and compare the relative contributions of rural and urban growth to poverty 
reduction. The authors found that correcting for urban bias leads to higher growth in 
agriculture, which reduces both rural and urban poverty, though the pro-poor effect is largest 
for rural areas. On the other hand, urban growth only contributes to urban poverty reduction 
and its effect on the rural poor is neither positive nor statistically significant. 
 
Based on data from a broad sample of developing countries in the early 1970s and 
mid- 1980s, Bourguignon and Morrison (1998) find that variables which measure agricultural 
productivity are important in explaining income inequality. Using cross-country regressions 
for each time period separately and then for the pooled data, the authors find that increasing 




Lipton and Longhurst (1989) suggest that, in its initial stages, the Green Revolution 
raised the labor-intensity of agricultural production, although this higher labor demand was 
slowly eroded due to subsequent adoptions of labor-displacing inputs. Similarly, Bingswanger 
and Quizon (1986) find a relatively low but positive output elasticity of agriculture with 
respect to labor.
8 Growth in agriculture also results from a shift from low-value to high-value 
crop or livestock production. Most high-value crop production, such as horticulture and 
intensified livestock production, are highly labor-intensive. Moreover, unlike the more capital-
intensive industrial sectors, agriculture has demonstrated its ability to generate employment 
opportunities for the poorest populations. A large body of empirical studies of the Green 
Revolution in Asia demonstrates how agricultural growth reached many small farms and 
raised large numbers of people out of poverty (see Rosegrant and Hazel 2000). 
                                                 
8 Growth in agriculture also results from a shift from low-value crop to high-value crop or livestock production. 
Most high-value crop production (such as horticulture) and intensified livestock production are highly labor-
intensive. For land abundant countries, expansion in cultivated area is often associated with increased labor-
usage, which provides employment opportunities for the poor even though land productivity may not increase. 
Part Two of this paper examines sectoral variations within agriculture in more detail.    15
Even though majority of the world’s poor live in rural areas, it does not mean that they 
are solely engaged in farming. Farm households often derive incomes from nonfarm activities, 
although their contribution tends to be smaller than agriculture and is often indirectly 
agriculture-related (Ashley and Maxwell 2001). Furthermore, apart from the landless rural 
population, most rural farm households manage risk by diversifying their incomes through off-
farm activities. Agricultural growth reduces poverty by providing a market for nonfarm 
products, especially given the high labor-intensity of nonfarm production. Although the early 
stages of technological change often directly benefit richer farmers who can more easily adopt 
the new technology, the consumption-linkages generated by rising farm incomes can stimulate 
growth in local markets. Therefore, even those households that do not benefit directly from 
improved technology will benefit indirectly through improved employment opportunities. 
Agricultural growth also benefits rural and urban consumers alike by driving down 
food prices. The poor typically spend a high share of their income on food, and therefore 
benefit from increases in food production that reduce prices. The strength of this effect 
depends, however, on the degree to which farm production is tradable and the associated 
price-elasticity of demand. For example, Alston et al. (1998) show that, following an increase 
in supply, the price decrease determining the distribution of benefits between producers and 
consumers depends on the elasticity of demand, which in turn depends primarily on the size of 
the market supplied (that is, tradability).
9 While the importance of food-supply in the growth 
process has already been discussed above, its link to poverty reduction should be understood 
within the broader context of development. By benefiting the poor, agricultural growth can 
facilitate development by smoothing structural transformation and reducing potentially painful 
adjustment costs as inequality becomes more binding on growth later in the development 
process. 
                                                 
9 When markets are poorly integrated and infrastructure is underdeveloped, increased output is likely to cause 
substantial falls in output prices, which consequently reduces the benefits to producers, even though gains to 
consumers may increase. This is discussed in subsequent sections.   16
Contemporary Skepticism about the Role of Agriculture in Africa 
Despite the above theories and the number of Asian case studies that support them, 
there is doubt about whether agriculture can successfully generate enough growth in Africa 
today. In many respects this doubt harks back to the immediate post-Independence 
industrialization policies of many low-income countries, including countries in Africa. At that 
time, priority was given to heavily subsidized and protected industries while agriculture was 
penalized and plundered through unfavorable macroeconomic, trade, tax and pricing policies. 
More recent skepticism amongst development scholars about agriculture’s relevance to growth 
is mainly based on the recognition of changed local and global conditions for Africa due to the 
impact of globalization. Some of the key positions promoted by this new breed of agricultural 
“skeptics” are elaborated below.   
The availability of cheap and plentiful food imports can allow African countries to 
leapfrog agricultural development and proceed directly to industrialization 
The trade perspective that dominated much development thinking in the 1970s and 
1980s has returned today with a new emphasis on the benefits of globalization. Early 
development economists acknowledged that trade could expand sufficiently to provide a 
necessary growth stimulus, but argued that trade alone is insufficient to promote development 
(Adelman 2001). 
  For example, based on neoclassical trade theory, it is plausible for resource rich 
countries in Africa to export abundant nonagricultural natural resources, such as oil and 
minerals, and import agricultural goods to meet their domestic demand. This might appear to 
eliminate the need to modernize agricultural sectors. However, while the static efficiency 
gains in resource allocation explained by trade theory are an important condition for growth 
and development, improvements in resource allocation by themselves do not generate 
sustained growth or broader development. Exports of natural resources can only become an 
engine of growth if the income generated from exports is channeled into productivity growth 
in nonnatural resource sectors and helps develop the broader economy.    17
In practice, it is almost impossible for any country to achieve sustainable growth by 
following trade theory and fully specializing in the exports of natural resource products. The 
existence of nontradable sectors such as services and other manufacturing sectors that are not 
inputs into oil and mineral production implies a much more complicated general equilibrium 
outcome that takes full account of the interlinkages between tradables and nontradables, and 
exportables and importables. Economic theory predicts a possible ‘Dutch Disease’ outcome in 
which growth in the oil and mineral export sector leads to an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate that penalizes other traded goods sectors, including agriculture. Income distribution is 
often another serious problem in such an economy, since rents are often captured by a small 
group of the population in the country or benefit an elite interest group through government 
intervention. Typically labeled as ‘enclave economies,’ these export sectors are often capital-
intensive with little demand for labor and weak links to the domestic economy through 
production and consumption. 
While the recent “bypass” argument is new in the sense that globalization and trade 
liberalization provide more export opportunities and make food even cheaper on the 
international market, the difficulties created by earlier attempts to “bypass” agriculture remain. 
First, most African countries possess a small and inefficient industrial base with an 
unimpressive growth performance. Turning this performance around in an open trade 
environment is a daunting task. Not only are fledgling industries expected to compete with the 
world’s best in export markets, but trade liberalization is a two-edged sword that also opens 
domestic markets to imports that can decimate whole swaths of industry before they have a 
chance to adjust and compete. The approach contrasts sharply with the proven and successful 
approach of many Asian countries that first nurtured their industries through growth in 
protected domestic markets and subsidized exports before requiring them to face the full force 
of international competition. 
Second, there is a scaling-up problem. Industry currently employs about 10-15percent 
of the labor force in Africa and its employment elasticity remains low compared to agriculture. 
Even if the performance of the industrial sector were to improve dramatically and grew at the   18
rates observed in many of Asia’s “Tiger” economies during their golden years, it would still 
take decades before a large enough share of the labor force could be pulled out of agriculture 
to seriously reduce poverty.  
Third, despite low world food prices, food costs remain high for many Africans 
because of high transport costs within the continent. Growing food where it is needed is still 
the least expensive option for many Africans. Moreover, while fixed exchange rates are 
largely a thing of the past, growing food imports still pressure foreign exchange markets, 
leading to currency depreciation and higher food costs in local currencies. This in turn raises 
real wages and dampens industrialization. 
It also needs to be pointed out that the early industrialization policies adopted by most 
African countries have resulted in serious urban bias in both public and private investments as 
well as in governments’ macroeconomic and trade policies. While many of these policies were 
abandoned, an urban-bias orientation still influences public investment and policy priorities in 
many countries today. If the new “bypass” argument further influenced the investment policies 
of African governments and international donors, it would create huge challenges towards 
generating agriculture-led growth in Africa. 
The “Rethinking Rural Development” School 
More recently, Ashley and Maxwell (2001), Ellis and Harris (2004), and others have 
advocated “rethinking rural development.” They argue that rural areas are highly 
heterogeneous in size, structure, capability of their populations, patterns of economic activity, 
and degree of integration with national and international economies. In most areas, agriculture 
is a relatively small production sector that will be commercially incorporated into national and 
international commodity chains. Most rural households already have diverse and 
geographically dispersed portfolios of income sources. Considering these changes, those who 
subscribe to the “rethinking rural development” school question whether agriculture can be the 
engine of rural growth and suggest instead promoting poverty reduction through a rural-
livelihoods framework. Ellis and Harris (2004) go further to suggest that public investment   19
should be geared towards improving the ease at which migrants can access major cities, where 
growth is assumed to be taking place. Migration, therefore, provides an opportunity for the 
benefits of growth to trickle down to rural households, where agricultural-based incomes 
remain stagnant. 
Several reasons are also used to question the role of agriculture given the changing 
global environment. First, long-term global declines in agricultural commodity prices have 
undermined the profitability of agriculture as a business. Secondly, the policy instruments that 
supported the Green Revolution in Asian countries, such as price supports, fertilizer and credit 
subsidies and irrigation schemes, are less acceptable models of public sector intervention 
today. Finally, the pressure on the natural resource base for agriculture is leading to worsening 
degradation and even declining productivity. In addition, Ashley and Maxwell (2001) note that 
the expectation of equitable growth through agriculture depends on the success of small farms. 
Yet, the rise in supermarkets, the growing importance of quality standards, and poor access to 
markets increasingly threatens the ability of smallholding farmers to compete with large-scale, 
commercial farmers.  
While this school is pessimistic about agriculture’s potential, it provides few viable 
alternatives to the primary growth role played by agriculture in the early stages of 
development or explains how growth will occur in Africa’s urban areas, where high 
unemployment and informal economies often dominate.  Instead, it emphasizes migration and 
rural nonfarm activities and believes diversification options for multioccupation and 
multilocation households can become the relevant engine of growth for rural areas in Africa. 
Indeed, rural income diversification has been a reality in developing countries for decades. In 
fact, the first large-scale rural household survey in Africa conducted in 1974-75 in Kenya 
found that smallholders derived at least half of their incomes from sources other than from the 
farming of their own lands (Kenya 1977). A similar situation is also reported by Reardon et al. 
(1994) from a series of studies in eight West African countries, and a review of 35 African 
case studies by Barrett and Reardon (2000) revealed that rural households derived a median of 
43 percent of their incomes from the nonfarm economy.   20
Nevertheless, diversification into nonfarm activities is not an unequivocally positive 
phenomenon. On the one hand, diversification may reflect a successful structural 
transformation in which rural workers are gradually absorbed into more lucrative nonfarm 
jobs, such as teaching, milling, or welding. Entry into these formal jobs often requires some 
capital, qualifications, and/or possibly social contacts (Start 2001; Thirtle et al. 2001). On the 
other hand, in Africa, diversification into the nonfarm economy is often driven by growing 
land scarcity, declining wages, and poor agricultural growth (Haggblade et al. 2002; Start 
2001).  When used as a coping strategy, nonfarm jobs are frequently informal, risky, and 
provide low returns, especially when barriers to entry are low and competition for employment 
is high (Thirtle et al. 2001; Collier and Gunning 1999).  The segmented nature of the rural 
nonfarm economy contributes to a replication of existing inequalities as wealthier farmers can 
better access those opportunities with the highest returns (Start 2001). As such, agricultural 
production represents an important safety net for poor farmers by offering both food security 
and the social support of an agrarian-based community (Bryceson 2000).   
Thus, if most African farmers have been unable to find pathways out of poverty 
despite income diversification strategies over many decades, then it is unclear why such a 
strategy should work better today, particularly in countries where the nonagricultural sectors 
are not thriving either. Even in many Asian countries, farmers were highly diversified before 
the Green Revolution (see evidence from India in Ravallion and Datt 1996). As Lipton (2004) 
argues, “Europe in 1740-1900 and Asia since 1960 show that when urban industrialization 
offers major prospects for employment (and poverty reduction), it is fairly late in an already 
successful, agriculture-led development process.” Yet, it is important to distinguish ‘drivers’ 
from ‘supporters’ of rural growth (Kydd 2005). Migration driven by a stagnant agricultural 
and rural environment or due to growth in low productivity urban sector activity, such as 
public service employment, is often a dead end, which Lipton characterizes as “the migration 
of despair.” In this case, migration “depresses wage rates, denudes rural areas of innovators, 
and hence, while it may briefly relieve extreme need, seldom cuts chronic poverty.” (Lipton 
2004, 7)   21
Most small farms cannot compete and remain viable in today’s globalized markets and 
hence, they should not be the priority of future agricultural investment strategies. 
Agricultural marketing chains are changing dramatically due to trade liberalization and 
broader processes of globalization. The small farmer is increasingly being asked to compete in 
markets that are much more demanding in terms of quality and food safety, more concentrated 
and integrated, and much more open to international competition. Supermarkets, for example, 
are playing a much more dominant role in controlling access to retail markets (Reardon et al. 
2003) and direct links to exporters are often essential for accessing high-value export markets. 
As small farms struggle to diversify into higher value products, they must increasingly meet 
the requirements of these demanding markets, both at home and overseas. These changes offer 
new opportunities to small farmers who can successfully access and compete in these 
transformed markets, but they are also a serious threat to those who cannot.  
At the same time as markets have become more unforgiving, structural adjustment and 
privatization programs have left many small farmers without adequate access to key inputs 
and services, including farm credit. State agencies no longer provide many direct marketing 
and service functions to small farms, leaving a vacuum that the private sector has yet to fill in 
many countries (Kherallah et al. 2002). The removal of subsidies has also made some key 
inputs, such as fertilizer, prohibitively expensive for many small farmers, and the removal of 
price stabilization programs has exposed farmers to greater price volatility. These problems 
are especially difficult for small farmers living in more remote regions with poor infrastructure 
and market access. Within this context, there is a growing view that most smallholders do not 
have a viable future in farming, and that agricultural development should now focus on larger 
and commercially-oriented farms that can successfully link to the new types of market chains.  
Admittedly, many of the economic and social advantages offered by small farms (as 
discussed above) slowly disappear as countries develop and labor becomes scarcer relative to 
land and capital, leading to a natural transition toward larger farms and an exodus of small-
farm workers to towns and nonfarm jobs. Yet, this transition does not normally begin until 
countries have grown out of the low-income status, and it typically takes several generations   22
to unfold. A common misdiagnosis stems from overlooking this broader economic context for 
determining the economics of farm size. 
For most low-income countries, the problem is not that small farms are inherently 
unviable in today's marketplace, but that they face an increasingly tilted playing field that, if 
left unchecked, could lead to their premature demise. Key requirements for ensuring their 
survival will be improving infrastructure and education, ensuring that small farms get the 
technologies and key inputs that they need, and promoting producer marketing organizations 
that can link small farmers to the new market chains. Small farmers cannot do all these things 
on their own, and the public, private and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) sectors all 
have important roles to play. The social and economic benefits from these kinds of 
interventions can be enormous.  
Agricultural development should now focus on high-value commodities and value-
added processing rather than food staples production. 
With chronic global surpluses of major food staples and rapid expansion in 
international agricultural trade, many see high-value commodities such as fruits, flowers, 
vegetables and livestock as the best opportunities for developing country farmers. In many 
successfully transformed countries, domestic demand for these products is growing rapidly 
and providing ready market outlets for increased domestic production. Yet, in many low-
income countries, domestic demand is much weaker, and the best opportunities are seen in 
export markets. Many African countries, for example, are being encouraged to expand into 
high-value, nontraditional exports, as well as to improve the quality of their traditional tree 
crop exports.  
In reality, the market opportunities for African agriculture are more nuanced (Diao and 
Hazell 2004). While there are opportunities for improving traditional exports through better 
quality and niche markets, and nontraditional exports are growing quite fast, albeit from a 
small base, the greatest market potential for most African farmers still lies in domestic and 
regional markets for food staples (cereals, roots and tubers, oil crops and livestock products).   23
For Africa as a whole, the consumption of these commodities accounts for more than 70 
percent of agricultural output and is projected to double by 2015. This will add about US$50 
billion per year to demand in 1996-2000 prices (Table 1). Moreover, with increasing 
commercialization and urbanization, much of this additional demand will translate into market 
transactions and not just additional on-farm consumption. There are no other agricultural 
markets that could offer such growth potential and benefit to Africa’s small farmers at such 
huge scales. Many small farms could significantly increase their incomes if they could capture 
a large share of this market growth.  
Table 1.  Size of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Agricultural Markets 









        
Traditional exports to non-Africa  2.2  2.4  4.0  8.6 
Nontraditional exports to non-Africa  1.3  2.8  2.0  6.1 
Other exports to non-Africa  0.5  0.7  0.7  1.9 
Intra-African trade  0.4  1.1  0.4  1.9 
Domestic markets for food staples  17.6  12.1  20.1  49.7 
        
Source: Trade figures are from UN COMTRADE (2002) and are 1996-2000 averages; domestic-market figures 
are for 2000 from FAOSTAT (2003). Domestic market demand includes the value of own consumption. 
The public sector has a relatively minor (enabling) role to play in Africa’s agricultural 
development, while the private sector should be in the driving seat. 
As agricultural markets become more globalized and consumer-driven, it is now 
fashionable to think that the private sector and producer organizations can perform most 
market chain functions. In this new paradigm, the government’s role should be limited to 
creating an enabling environment, such as setting and regulating grades and standards, 
ensuring food safety, and registering and enforcing contracts. This contrasts sharply with the 
key role that the public sector played in food staple market chains during the early years of the 
Green Revolution in Asia.    24
At that time, the public sector went far beyond a facilitating role and provided most 
key services itself, including research and development (R&D), extension, storage and 
marketing, and the supply of improved seeds, fertilizer, and credit. Moreover, the government 
intervened to stabilize prices for producers and consumers alike, and provided subsidies for 
many key inputs to encourage their uptake.  These interventions also helped ensure that small 
farmers were able to participate, and this contributed greatly to the levels of poverty reduction 
achieved. The IFPRI calculations show that most of these policies and interventions had 
favorable benefit/cost ratios in the early years, but these ratios worsened over time once the 
interventions had served their primary purpose. Unfortunately, once institutionalized, it has 
proved very difficult to remove these interventions, and as input use increased, the costs to the 
governments soared. Today, for example, India spends about US$10 billion per year on 
unproductive subsidies.  
The international development community is now so obsessed with post- Green 
Revolution problems that it is asking Africa to launch its own agricultural revolution without 
these public interventions. Africa is being asked to rely almost exclusively on the private 
sector and producer organizations. Is the international development community asking for the 
impossible? Is it drawing the right lessons from Asia? There is hardly any credible evidence to 
suggest that the private sector can take the lead in market chains for staple foods during the 
early stages of agricultural development. As farmers struggle with low productivity and high 
subsistence needs, low input use, low incomes, poor infrastructure, high risks and the like, the 
amount of profit to be made in market chains for food staples remains low and unattractive for 
much private investment. There is also a growing body of studies showing that important 
institutional and market failures are to be expected at that level of development. It is a well-
known fact that no Asian country developed its food staple agriculture from a subsistence to 
market orientation without heavy public intervention in the market chains. 
This is not to advocate a return to costly and inefficient parastatals or to hefty and 
poorly targeted subsidies. Nor is it an argument against a strong role for the private sector 
where this can work, as in many high-value market chains. What is really needed is a much   25
better understanding of those aspects of public intervention that really worked in Asia and why 
(for example, Dorward et al. 1998; Dorward et al. 2004). Then, important lessons can be 
drawn about the institutional innovations needed to bring those essential ingredients to Africa. 
III.   THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA: 
SELECTED COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
The previous section suggests that there is growing skepticism within the international 
development community over agriculture’s potential contribution to growth in Africa. These 
arguments, which to some extent advocate bypassing agricultural development, may influence 
government and donor agencies’ policies and investment strategies. Whether African countries 
believe they can bypass agricultural development, especially given cheap and plentiful food 
available in world markets, will directly influence priority-setting. Furthermore, pessimism 
concerning the role and competitiveness of small farms, which dominate African agriculture, 
will directly affect governments’ agricultural investment strategies. Similarly, an optimistic 
perception of the potential role of high-value agricultural commodities and nontraditional 
exports may influence investment decisions and the allocation of limited resources. 
Emerging skepticism is one school within the current debate over the role of 
agriculture in setting Africa’s development priorities for the new millennium. An alterative 
school continues to support the importance of agriculture in Africa’s development process. 
These proponents of agriculture emphasize that the sector has sufficient scale to make the 
necessary impact on aggregate growth and that the currently low levels of agricultural 
productivity implies that Africa has considerable potential to catch up to the competitiveness 
of other developing countries. Furthermore, agriculture’s proponents highlight that, despite 
skepticism over agriculture and the resulting promotion of alternative sectors, agriculture, in 
fact, has performed better than other sectors in low-income African countries.  
This section addresses the current debate between agriculture’s skeptics and 
proponents. It provides empirical evidence on the importance of agriculture for growth and 
poverty reduction in Africa by conducting case studies in a number of low-income African   26
countries. These are selected according to country typology so that general conclusions can be 
drawn. 
A Typology of African Countries 
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the role of agriculture is highly 
related to a country’s stage of development. Accordingly, per capita income is used in the 
typology as a proxy for development to classify African countries into low- and middle-
income groups (Table 2). Only eight percent of Africa’s population lives in middle-income 
countries, where average GDP per capita is almost ten times higher than the average for low-
income Africa (Appendix,  Table A4).
10 Agriculture is less important in middle-income 
countries and on average generates less than ten percent of GDP. Higher average per capita 
incomes typically correspond to lower poverty rates, with middle-income countries in total 
containing less than one percent of Africa’s poor population. However, one-half of the 
population in middle-income countries still lives in rural areas, and in most cases the poor still 
depend on agriculture for their livelihoods.  For example, two-thirds of Swaziland’s 
population lives on less than a dollar a day, with a vast majority of these people living in rural 
areas dependent on agricultural incomes. Therefore, while agriculture may not be a dominant 
sector in most middle-income economies, it still plays an important role in reducing poverty.  
This study focuses on low-income countries. More than 90 percent of Africa’s 
population lives in low-income countries where per capita incomes average one dollar per day. 
Agriculture accounts for around one-third of GDP and two-thirds of the population live in 
rural areas. The industrial sector, including mining, accounts for less than a quarter of GDP. 
Although services collectively comprise the largest sector on average, this sector consists 
mainly of public and nontradable services. For example, the government in most low-income 
African countries accounts for around ten percent of GDP. Most private services are closely 
tied to agricultural and industrial production and, therefore, are unlikely to become engines of 
growth during the early stages of development.  
                                                 
10 These countries are shown in the far-right column of the typology and have per capita GDP above US$1000 
per year.    27
To better understand the role of agriculture within the low-income group it is necessary 
to further distinguish countries according to a range of indicators reflecting agricultural 
potential and alternative sources of growth (Table 2). Agricultural potentials draw on a 
classificatory scheme developed by Dixon et al. (2001) and include a range of measures such 
as agroecological conditions and population densities.
11 According to this indicator, 26 out of 
the 34 low-income African countries have more favorable agricultural potential. However, 
even in countries with favorable conditions, agriculture competes with other sectors for 
limited resources. Countries with rich mineral and oil endowments may have alternative 
sources of growth and so are separated in the typology. Furthermore, coastal countries may 
have advantages in export-oriented agriculture or greater opportunities in nonagriculture. 
Therefore, coastal and landlocked countries are also separated.  The typology, therefore, 
identifies four groups of low-income countries:  (i) coastal, (ii) landlocked, (iii) mineral-rich; 
and (iv) less-favorable agricultural potential. The characteristics of each group are discussed in 
turn. 
Coastal Countries without Large Mineral Resources 
More than four-fifths of Africa’s population lives in one of the 26 low-income 
countries classified as having more favorable agricultural conditions. Although 17 of these 26 
countries have access to the coast, many have significant mineral or oil resources and so are 
classified as ‘mineral-rich’ in the typology. Therefore, while half of Africa’s population lives 
in coastal countries, only one-fifth lives in coastal countries without large mineral or oil 
resources. These ten countries form the first group in the typology (Table 2). These countries 
have more favorable agricultural conditions, fewer natural barriers to trade, and their 
development is less likely to be driven by a mineral-based industry.  
The first group of coastal countries lies mostly in West Africa, with the exception of 
Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania along the Eastern coast. They have grown at an annual rate 
of 3.5 percent over the last 15 years, which is higher than the average for low-income Africa. 
Agriculture accounts for one-third of GDP compared to one-fifth for industry. Therefore while 
                                                 
11 See Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix for more details on the data underlying the typology.   28
agriculture’s growth rate of 3.5 percent per year is lower than that of industry, the sector’s 
contribution to overall GDP growth is larger. 
Table 2.  Cross-country Typology for Sub-Saharan Africa 
   Agricultural share above 
average (34% GDP) 
Agricultural share below 









































































































Notes: The number in parentheses is national dollar-a-day poverty rate in 1999 (UNIDO 2004; World Bank 
1995, 1997 and 2003). Agricultural conditions are based on FAO Farming Systems’ potentials weighted by 
system’s land coverage within each country (Dixon et al. 2004). Agriculture shares are for 2001 from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2003). Geographic and natural resource classification based on UNIDO 
(2004). Per capita GDP growth is measured in constant local currency. Per capita GDP is in US dollars (i.e., not 
international dollars). Six Sub-Saharan countries are excluded due to data-limitations (Eritrea, Liberia, Mayotte, 
São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, and Somalia).  
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Almost two-thirds of the population of these coastal countries lives in rural areas 
where poverty is most severe. However, poverty as a whole is lower in coastal countries, 
with 41 percent of the population falling below the dollar-a-day poverty line compared to 
more than 56 percent for low-income Africa as a whole. Furthermore, there are a number 
of outlier countries that raise the average poverty rate for the coastal group, such as 
Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania. The remaining coastal countries have substantially lower 
poverty rates, many of which fall below the average poverty rate for middle-income 
African countries.  
Landlocked Countries without Large Mineral Resources 
One of the characteristics of Africa is its large number of landlocked countries. 
The fourteen low-income African countries that do not have coastal access account for 
more than a third of Africa’s total population. This is substantially higher than in other 
developing regions of the world. Being landlocked can present a significant natural 
barrier to trade and can undermine both agricultural and industrial export opportunities. 
Furthermore, many of Africa’s landlocked countries have particularly poor agricultural 
conditions, especially those countries lying in the Sahel. However, the second group of 
countries in the typology includes only those landlocked countries that have more 
favorable agricultural conditions and that do not have large mineral or oil resources 
(Table 2). These six countries, which are classified as ‘landlocked’ in the typology, 
account for one-fifth of Africa’s total population.  
Similar to the first group of coastal countries, agriculture and industry account for 
one-third and one-fifth of GDP, respectively. Although per capita GDP is lower in 
landlocked countries than in coastal countries, the former has experienced slightly faster 
growth over the last 15 years. The composition of growth in landlocked and coastal 
countries is very similar, with agriculture growing more slowly than industry but 
contributing more to the overall GDP growth. Despite similar economic structures, the 
share of the population living in rural areas is substantially higher in landlocked countries 
at almost 80 percent. Poverty is also higher, with 55 percent of the population falling   30
below the dollar-a-day poverty line. Again, the average level of poverty is biased 
upwards by outlier countries, in this case by Ethiopia’s extremely high poverty rate. 
However, after removing outliers, the remaining landlocked countries still tend to have 
higher poverty rates than coastal countries. Therefore, despite having similar initial 
conditions to coastal countries, landlocked countries tend to have lower per capita 
incomes, higher poverty, and larger rural populations.   
Mineral-Rich Countries 
A further characteristic of Africa is its substantial mineral wealth. Two-fifths of 
Africa’s population lives in low-income countries with both favorable agricultural 
conditions and significant mineral and oil resources. Furthermore, they have grown 
slowly over the last 15 years at an average GDP growth rate of only 1.4 percent per year. 
As expected, industry, which includes mining, is more important in mineral-rich 
countries, accounting for 35 percent of GDP. However, as with other low-income African 
countries, agriculture still generates one-third of GDP in mineral-rich countries. 
Moreover, agriculture has grown at 2.8 percent per year compared to only 1.3 percent for 
industry. Agriculture is still the primary source of growth in many mineral-rich countries, 
contributing on average twice as much as industry to overall GDP growth.  
Average per capita GDP is highest for mineral-rich countries. However, there is 
considerable variation in this group, which contains countries with both the highest and 
lowest GDP per capita amongst all low-income African countries. Although the industrial 
sector is larger in mineral-rich countries, almost 60 percent of the population still live in 
rural areas. Furthermore, despite higher average per capita incomes, poverty is 
substantially higher in mineral-rich countries with 70 percent of the population falling 
below the dollar-a-day poverty line. Therefore, while many low-income African countries 
are well-endowed with mineral resources and thus have alternative opportunities for 
growth outside of agriculture, these natural endowments have so far failed to generate 
significant growth or poverty reduction.    31
Countries with Less-Favorable Agricultural Potential  
The final group includes those countries with less favorable agricultural 
conditions, regardless of whether they are landlocked, coastal or mineral-rich. Only ten 
percent of Africa’s population lives in these countries. There is considerable diversity 
across countries in this group. Many are situated in the Sahel and have poor access to the 
coast. By contrast, the coastal countries in this group are island states, while the 
landlocked countries include mountainous Rwanda and Burundi. Despite poor conditions, 
agriculture generates almost 40 percent of GDP, twice the contribution of industry. 
Furthermore, agriculture has grown substantially faster than industry over the last 15 
years. Strong growth and a large share of GDP imply that agriculture has been the 
primary driver of growth in these countries, contributing almost three times more to GDP 
growth than industry.  
Almost three-quarters of the population live in rural areas, which is substantially 
higher than the average for low-income Africa. Average GDP per capita is particularly 
low in countries with less-favorable agricultural conditions, although there is substantial 
variation between landlocked and coastal countries within this group. More than 60 
percent of the less-favored countries’ population lives in poverty, with particularly high 
poverty in mineral-rich countries. Countries with less-favorable agricultural conditions 
therefore face huge challenges and yet lack many of the resources of other African 
countries. However, despite poor conditions, agriculture has and continues to offer the 
only opportunity for growth and poverty reduction for many of these countries.  
Country Case Studies  
The typology reveals the diversity of conditions and challenges facing African 
countries, thus indicating the difficulty of drawing general conclusions for the continent. 
Therefore, when considering the role of agriculture in Africa’s development, it is 
particularly important to account for such diversity. The remainder of this section 
examines the role of agriculture under different initial conditions by selecting countries 
from the four different groups identified in the typology. In each case study country, the   32
potential magnitude of agriculture’s contribution to growth and poverty reduction is 
examined and contrasted against alternative sources of growth. This is done using 
economy-wide models that compare different structures of growth with their poverty 
outcomes. The selected case study countries include Ghana (coastal); Ethiopia and 
Uganda (landlocked); Zambia (mineral-rich); and Rwanda (less-favorable agricultural 
conditions).  
Overview of the Case Study Countries 
Both Ethiopia and Rwanda are landlocked, vulnerable to recurrent droughts, and 
are among the world’s poorest countries. Agriculture contributes substantially to GDP 
and more than four-fifths of their populations live in rural areas (Table 3). By contrast, 
manufacturing contributes relatively little to GDP and is overwhelmingly dominated by 
agriculture-related processing. This is particularly true for Ethiopia, where industry 
generates only 11 percent of GDP, the lowest share in all low-income African countries. 
Although the service sector is large and has grown rapidly over the last 15 years, much of 
this growth has been driven by the public sector, especially in the capital cities. 
By contrast, Ghana and Uganda have experienced high and stable growth in both 
GDP and agriculture over a sustained period. Ghana in particular is one of only a handful 
of developing countries to have consistently maintained a positive per capita GDP annual 
growth rate over the last twenty years. Ghana is the only coastal country among the five 
case studies and has a relatively high share of industry to GDP due to agroprocessing, 
textile manufacturing, and gold mining. However, agriculture still generates one-third of 
GDP. Within agriculture, crops and livestock account for three-quarters of agricultural 
production, and are the primary activity of two-fifths percent of the population (Aryeetey 
and McKay 2004).  
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Table 3.  Comparative Indicators Across the Selected Case study Countries  
  Share of GDP (%) 
(1999) 
  GDP growth rate 
(%) 
(1985-99) 
  Poverty headcount (%) 
 Agric.  Industry    Agric.  Total    $1-a-
day 
National rate 
Ethiopia 52.3  11.1    2.7 1.8    85.2  51.1  44.2 
               (1992/93)  (1999/00) 
Ghana 35.9  25.2    2.7  5.0    44.8  51.7  39.5 
               (1991/92)  (1998/99) 
Rwanda   40.5  21.6    3.2  1.8    58.9  40.0  60.3
  
               (1983-85)  (1999/01) 
Uganda 36.4  20.9    3.5  9.0    40.8  56.0  35.0 
               (1991/92)  (1999/00) 
Zambia 22.1  25.6    4.5  -0.3    79.3  68.9  75.4 
               (1991)  (1998) 
Sources: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005); UNIDO (2004); Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development, Ethiopia (2003); Ghana Statistical Services, Ghana (2000); Ministry of Finance, 
Rwanda (2002); Okidi et al. (2004); Thurlow and Wobst (2004). 
 
Agriculture contributes less to GDP in Zambia than it does in the other four case 
study countries. This reflects the country’s long-standing dependence on copper 
production and exports, which fostered a dualistic economy biased towards urban-based 
industrialization. In addition to its vulnerability to volatile international prices, copper 
production is a capital-intensive, enclave industry with weak backward linkages into rural 
areas. Therefore, growth driven by the mining sector has yet to provide the magnitude of 
poverty reduction needed in this impoverished country.   
The five countries share not only a high concentration of poverty in rural areas, 
but also a history of bias against the agricultural sector that only recently has been 
reversed through policy reforms. Until the early 1980s, self-proclaimed socialist regimes 
in some of these countries frequently espoused an ideology of self-sufficiency, and aimed 
to keep food prices low for politically powerful urban constituents, finance import-
substitution industrialization, and/or support rural producers through input subsidies and   34
assured output markets. Yet, rather than improving agricultural technology and 
facilitating agriculture’s positive linkages to the rest of the economy, the use of 
mechanisms such as inefficient marketing boards, overvalued exchange rates, and pan-
territorial pricing resulted in agricultural stagnation or decline. These approaches were 
not only economically inefficient, but also financially unsustainable, particularly as 
international commodity prices for their traditional agricultural and mineral exports 
declined. The heavily subsidized and protected state-managed industries were highly 
inefficient and uncompetitive in both international and domestic markets, while stagnant 
agriculture resulted in growing food gaps in domestic markets. These induced foreign 
exchange constraints and higher food prices, which themselves dampened the 
industrialization process. Consequently, not only did agriculture suffer but so did other 
sectors in these economies.   
Precipitated either by economic crisis or political change, most of these countries 
eventually adopted structural reforms during the 1980s and 1990s. These reforms were 
based on restoring macroeconomic stability and liberalizing trade and domestic markets. 
Correcting the adverse agricultural terms-of-trade created under import substitution and 
reducing or eliminating export taxes on agricultural products have made the agricultural 
sector one of the main beneficiaries of the reforms. Moreover, the typical devaluation of 
the exchange rates helped eliminate the black market premium on export sectors. While 
dismantling costly and inefficient parastatals provided farmers with improved incentives, 
the structural adjustment and privatization programs have left many small farmers 
without adequate access to key inputs and services, including farm credits. The outcome 
of long-term, urban-biased investments and polices still influences the allocation of 
public resources and investments, although the role of agriculture in growth and poverty 
reduction is increasingly being emphasized in these countries.  
Nevertheless, the shift towards support for agriculture during the reform and 
adjustment period, either indirectly through the removal of adverse policies or directly 
through providing market support for targeted agricultural commodities (such as price   35
supports for cocoa in Ghana) has had a positive impact on agricultural growth and 
poverty reduction in these countries over the last decade. As seen in Table 3, the 
incidence of poverty has declined in four of the five countries at the national levels, 
except for Rwanda where the economy was still in its recovering process from 1994’s 
genocide. In Zambia, poverty declines in rural regions were accompanied by poverty 
increases in urban areas due to the shocks created by the collapse of copper prices and the 
collapse of state-supported urban industry under the structural adjustment process.    
The potential contribution of agriculture to poverty reduction in the five selected 
countries is analyzed using economy-wide models developed for each country. The 
following section describes the major features of the models and how micro-level poverty 
data are integrated with macro-level growth data.   
The Economy-wide Models and Data Sources  
The country studies are based on economy-wide simulation methods. Two 
different types of models are used for the country studies: economy-wide multimarket 
(EMM) models for Ethiopia, Ghana and Rwanda, and computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models for Uganda and Zambia. Although the CGE approach is preferable, the 
choice of methodology was constrained by the availability of for each country. Only in 
Uganda and Zambia was there sufficient data available to construct the highly-
disaggregated social accounting matrices necessary to calibrate the CGE models. 
However, despite their differences, both types of models disaggregate the national 
economies into subnational provinces or regions, so that the analysis of growth and 
poverty linkages can be conducted at the subnational level. For example, in the remote 
regions where the rural economy is dominant and poverty is high, the growth-poverty 
linkages may be different than in regions with high levels of urbanization and 
concentrated industrial production and urban employment.  
There are many producers and consumers in each of the country models. These 
are aggregations from the most recent nationally-representative household survey. The   36
aggregations reflect the heterogeneity of production and consumption patterns across 
subnational regions and between rural and urban areas. If data is available, the producers 
or consumers in the models are further aggregated according to other economic or social 
indicators captured in the household survey data (for example, according to sources of 
income, labor markets, gender, or other household characteristics). In both types of the 
models, the agricultural and manufacturing sectors are relatively disaggregated in order to 
analyze growth-poverty linkages at the subsector levels and across subnational regions.  
While the economy-wide models already capture much of the heterogeneity 
across regions and rural and urban areas, the detailed information contained in the 
household surveys is not fully utilized. Therefore in order to retain this detailed 
information, a microsimulation model is linked with each country’s economy-wide model 
in order to analyze how growth at the national and subregional levels influences poverty 
at the detailed household level. These microsimulation models capture household-level 
heterogeneity in income sources, participation in economic activities, and consumption 
expenditure patterns. By linking microsimulation models with economy-wide models, a 
similar national GDP growth rate can result in different poverty and distributional 
outcomes. A detailed description of the models, their underlying data sources, and how 
the national growth can affect household level poverty is provided in the appendix. In the 
following sections the models are used to examine growth-poverty linkages at the 
sectoral level, or in other words, how agricultural and industrial growth influences the 
rate of poverty reduction in the five case study countries. 
Agricultural Growth is More Pro-poor than Industrial Growth 
A baseline scenario is first simulated in which the five case study countries are 
assumed to continue growing according to current trends until 2015. These trends include 
not only the level of aggregate economic growth but also its sectoral composition.
12 It is 
now widely understood that most African countries are unlikely to meet the first 
                                                 
12 The CGE models are further calibrated to match observed trends on the demand-side of growth and for 
key macroeconomic indicators (e.g., physical/human capital accumulation, current account changes, and 
terms-of-trade).    37
Millenium Development Goals (MDG) of halving poverty by 2015 unless their growth 
performance improves dramatically. Taking Ethiopia as an example, the model’s baseline 
scenario shows that if the current level and composition of growth is maintained, then the 
poverty headcount rate is likely to remain unchanged at around 44.3 percent by 2015 (cf. 
Table 4). Ethiopia therefore needs to not only accelerate the level of growth, but also find 
ways in which to enhance the ‘pro-poorness’ of growth. In other words, identify the kind 
or composition of growth that is most effective at reducing poverty and that raises the 
poverty-growth elasticity. In the context of the current debate, it is necessary to consider 
the relative importance of agriculture and industry in helping Africa achieve its 
development objective of significantly reducing poverty.  
The models are used to examine how differences in the structure of growth in 
each of the five case study countries influence the rate of poverty reduction. More 
specifically, two simulations are presented in which agricultural and industrial growth are 
accelerated separately and the effectiveness of this additional growth in reducing poverty 
is compared. To make the results comparable, poverty-growth elasticities are calculated 
for each scenario in the five countries.
13 Table 3 shows that the poverty-growth elasticity 
is consistently larger when additional growth is driven by agriculture rather than 
nonagriculture. Again taking Ethiopia as an example, a 1 percent annual increase in per 
capita GDP driven by agriculture-led growth leads to 1.66 percent reduction in the 
poverty headcount rate per year. By contrast, a similar increase in per capita GDP driven 
by nonagriculture leads to only 0.73 percent fall in the poverty rate. These disparities in 
poverty-growth elasticities can translate into significantly different reductions in the 
                                                 
13 The poverty-growth elasticity used in this study measures the responsiveness of the poverty rate to 
changes in the per capita GDP growth rate. The formula for this elasticity is shown below 
P0 P0 P0 GDPpc





where  P0 Δ  and GDPpc Δ are average annual changes (from the base-year) in the poverty headcount rate 
and level of per capita GDP, and P0  andGDPpc are the base-year poverty headcount rate and per capita 
GDP. The poverty-growth elasticity measures the percentage change in the poverty headcount rate caused 
by a one-percent increase in per capita GDP. This is not equivalent to a percentage point change in the 
poverty headcount rate.   38
poverty headcount over time. For example, with similar GDP growth, the poverty 
headcount in Ethiopia falls to 26.5 percent under the agriculture-led growth scenario 
compared with 37.3 percent under the nonagriculture-led growth scenario. Given its 
larger impact on poverty, agriculture-led growth in Ethiopia lifts an additional 9.6 million 
people out of poverty compared to nonagriculture-led growth, despite the fact that overall 
GDP grows at the similar rate under the two scenarios. These findings are consistent 
across the five countries studied. Given a similar GDP growth rate, the calculated 
poverty-growth elasticities are always higher under the agriculture-led scenario. 
However, the magnitudes of these differences vary across countries.  
The poverty-growth elasticities are endogenous outcomes from the model results. 
Growth affects individuals differently due to heterogeneity across regions and 
households. With different income sources and locations within a country, changes in 
income and consumption across households can differ considerably from average 
changes at the national level (that is, per capita GDP or total consumption). To capture 
growth-poverty linkages within a country, it is necessary to account for changes in the 
distribution of incomes, which is primarily determined by country-specific initial 
conditions. For example, in some countries agriculture contributes a large share to 
national GDP, and many households live in rural regions dominated by agriculture. For 
these households, participation in agricultural activities is often the major source of 
income, and hence they are likely to benefit more from agriculture-led growth than 
nonagricultural growth. Households with greater opportunities to work in the urban sector 
or who can take advantage of nearby city markets to produce higher-value agricultural 
products, may concentrate closer to urban centers and be better positioned to benefit from 
nonagriculture or export agriculture. Since such households are usually less poor than 
remoter households, economic growth driven by nonagriculture or agricultural exports 
may have less of an impact on poverty reduction. For example, according to the Rwandan 
national household survey conducted in 2000/01, agriculture accounts for 50 percent of 
household income at the national level, while it accounts for 75 percent for the average 
poor household. The importance of agricultural incomes is even higher in poorer regions   39
of the country. Under these circumstances, agricultural growth is expected to be more 
pro-poor than nonagricultural growth since it is a more important income source for the 
poor.  
Agricultural growth can also benefit urban and landless rural households if rising 
agricultural productivity lowers food prices. This is particularly important for poor urban 
and landless rural households for whom food purchases are major items in their 
expenditure baskets. For example, Ethiopia’s 1999/2000 national household survey 
showed that poor urban households on average spend more than 50 percent of their total 
income on staple foods, which is higher than the corresponding 30 percent for all urban 
households. 
Therefore, the initial conditions in each country are the primary factors 
determining the size of the poverty-growth elasticity. However, it should be noted that 
the models’ assumptions can also affect this elasticity, given that it is calculated ex-ante 
from the model simulations (i.e., as opposed to ex-post estimations from survey data). For 
example, the assumption on the labor market (that is., labor mobility across regions and 
between rural and urban areas) can affect whether growth is shared by a majority of the 
population. Assuming perfect labor markets and full employment implies that rural 
households, whether they are poor or not, can equally benefit from urban growth by 
migrating to urban areas and participating in urban-based nonagricultural sectors. On the 
other hand, if there are imperfect labor markets in certain regions, especially those 
dominated by rural areas, then poor or rural households have fewer opportunities to 
participate in urban-based growth.
14 Admittedly, these assumptions, which are often 
country–specific, make it more difficult to compare results across the five countries. 
However, it is reasonable to compare the poverty-growth elasticities produced by the 
models within a country, since these scenarios are conducted using the same model with 
identical underlying assumptions. 
                                                 
14 Detailed descriptions of the assumptions underlying the various models are provided in the appendix.   40
Table 4.  Comparison of Agricultural and Nonagricultural Growth Scenarios 






Ethiopia (2003-2015)      
     Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  0.5  2.4  2.4 
     Annual GDP growth rate (%)  3.1  5.0  5.0 
          Agriculture  2.5  5.0  2.7 
          Nonagriculture  3.7  5.0  7.0 
     Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  44.3  26.5  37.3 
     Difference in poor population in 2015 (1000)    -15,904  -6,280 
     Poverty-growth elasticity -  -1.66  -0.73 
Ghana (2003-2015)      
     Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  2.2  3.1  3.1 
     Annual GDP growth rate (%)  4.7  5.7  5.7 
          Agriculture  4.6  7.0  4.6 
          Nonagriculture  4.8  4.8  6.2 
     Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  23.7  17.3  21.5 
     Difference in poor population in 2015 (1000)    -1,722  -586 
     Poverty-growth elasticity -1.49  -1.78  -1.33 
Rwanda (2003-2015)      
     Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  0.7  3.2  3.2 
     Annual GDP growth rate (%)  3.4  6.0  6.0 
          Agriculture  3.3  7.9  3.5 
          Nonagriculture  3.4  3.5  8.1 
     Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  55.5  34.6  43.3 
     Difference in poor population in 2015 (1000)    -2,280  -1,334 
     Poverty-growth elasticity -1.09  -1.41  -0.84 
Uganda (1999-2015)      
     Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  1.6  2.8  2.8 
     Annual GDP growth rate (%)  5.2  6.4  6.4 
          Agriculture  5.1  7.6  5.3 
          Nonagriculture  5.3  5.2  7.4 
     Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  27.8  17.6  21.7 
     Difference in poor population in 2015 (1000)    -3,993  -2,388 
     Poverty-growth elasticity -0.98  -1.58  -1.10 
Zambia (2001-2015)      
     Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  2.0  3.0  3.0 
     Annual GDP growth rate (%)  4.0  5.0  5.0 
          Agriculture  4.6  7.7  4.5 
          Nonagriculture
  3.8 4.0  5.1 
     Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  68.3  58.9  64.4 
     Difference in poor population in 2015 (1000)    -1,253  -529 
     Poverty-growth elasticity -0.35  -0.58  -0.38 
Source: Authors’ simulations and calculations. 
1. The nonagricultural simulation for Zambia involved accelerating growth in only the industrial sectors.  
The large gap between the poverty-growth elasticities in the two scenarios 
reported in Table 3 indicates the relative importance of agricultural growth, especially 
for poorer rural households. Agriculture’s proponents suggest that the large size of the   41
agricultural sector in most African countries means that this sector is able to contribute 
significantly to aggregate growth. However, a small agricultural share of GDP, as is the 
case in Zambia, does not imply that the agricultural sector is less important for generating 
pro-poor growth. Zambia’s economic structure partly reflects the country’s long-standing 
dependence on copper production and exports, which has fostered a dual economy biased 
in favor of urban-based industrialization. Copper mining is a capital-intensive enclave 
industry with few backward linkages to rural areas. Therefore, growth driven by this 
sector does not provide the magnitude of poverty reduction needed in this impoverished 
country. The model simulations for Zambia show that growth in the nonagricultural 
sector, even including the nonmining industrial sectors, is less effective at reducing 
poverty than an agriculture-led growth strategy. As seen in Table 3, growth in the 
nonagricultural sector would reduce poverty to 64.4 percent by 2015 compared with 58.9 
percent by the same year under an agriculture-led growth scenario. 
Broad-based Agricultural Growth is More Pro-poor than Export-led Growth 
In recent years, traditional and nontraditional export agriculture has grown rapidly 
in many African countries, and these high-value crops have often received the most 
policy support from the governments. In Ghana, for example, the cocoa sector has 
historically received considerable support, despite the higher prevalence of poverty 
among food crop farmers. Even with the agricultural reforms implemented at the end of 
the 1980s, the cocoa sector has still received priority attention over food crops. While 
such high-value agriculture may have greater potential to grow, its contribution to overall 
economic growth may not be sufficient within the foreseeable future given its small 
initial base in most African countries. Moreover, growth in high-value export crops may 
only reach those farmers with better urban and/or foreign market access, and will 
therefore have little impact on the food costs of the poor.  
In Ethiopia, cereals, pulses, root crops, and oil crops compose almost 65 percent 
of agriculture. Along with livestock, a majority of Ethiopia’s poor depend heavily on 
cultivating these staple crops. This is equally true in Rwanda, where the share of staples   42
crops and livestock in the agricultural sector’s total output is as high as 90 percent. By 
contrast, the shares of staples and livestock in the other three case study countries are 
relatively low, but it is still as high as 70 percent of Ghana’s agricultural total output, 54 
percent in Uganda and 65 percent in Zambia. 
The degree to which different agricultural subsectors can contribute to growth and 
poverty reduction varies considerably. This subsection evaluates two broad groups of 
agricultural subsectors in terms of the effectiveness of their growth to reduce poverty: 
staple crops and livestock, and traditional and nontraditional export crops. This is done 
empirically using applied economy-wide models that determine the poverty reduction 
resulting from accelerating growth in each of the two sectors. 
Assuming similar growth rates at the subsector level, greater economy-wide 
growth will be obviously generated by the larger subsector, in turn producing a 
(generally) larger effect on poverty. On the other hand, small subsectors, such as 
nontraditional export crops, may have greater capacity to grow rapidly and may require 
lower levels of investment to do so. Thus, in determining whether a subsector will 
ultimately drive growth, both the linkage effects on the economy and poverty as well as 
the growth potential (determined by supply and demand factors) must be considered. In 
order to ensure that the two simulations are comparable despite having different initial 
contributions to GDP, it is necessary to accelerate growth in each subsector until a similar 
growth rate is achieved at the aggregate level. Taking Zambia as an example, in order for 
export crops alone to generate an additional one percent annual growth in aggregate GDP 
(from four to five percent), these crops would have to grow at 23 percent per year 
because this subsector is initially very small (Table 4). By contrast, the staples sector is 
substantially larger and so does not have to grow as rapidly to achieve the same 
additional one percent annual growth in GDP. Similarly, to achieve five percent growth 
in annual agricultural GDP in Ethiopia, the required growth rate for the staple crops is 
five percent if additional agricultural growth is driven by these crops alone. However, it 
requires 18 percent annual growth for export crops to achieve the same agricultural   43
growth rate. Such high growth requirements for export crops are true in each of the five 
case study countries. Although these sectors undoubtedly have considerable growth 
potential, it is reasonable to question whether such high growth rates in any agricultural 
subsector are feasible over a sustained period of 10 to 15 years. 
Growth in staple crops is not only necessary for agricultural and overall economic 
growth, but it also can lead to strongly pro-poor outcomes because of its broad base. The 
model simulations show that even if extremely high growth in export crops is possible, it 
leads to much smaller poverty-growth elasticities. For example, if the same five percent 
agricultural GDP growth rate in Ethiopia is driven by the staples sector, then the national 
poverty rate is likely to fall to 27 percent by 2015. This is 4.4 percentage points lower 
than the poverty rate expected under the agricultural-export-led scenario with a similar 
five percent of agricultural growth. Therefore, despite generating the same aggregate 
growth rate, accelerated staples-led growth is able to lift additional four million people 
out of poverty by 2015. 
While growth in the staples sector can play a critical role in reducing poverty, past 
growth in this sector has typically risen from area expansion within the five case study 
countries. There is an extensive literature that tries to identify the key factors capable of 
increasing staple sector productivity. Many studies, focusing on the farmers incentives to 
increase productivity, find that declines in the provision of credit from the banking sector 
and low accessibility to modern inputs are among the main factors affecting farmers’ 
incentives. These problems often arise when input subsidies are removed during 
liberalization and are not replaced by appropriate market-oriented institutions and policy 
instruments. Such problems tend to be more serious in rural areas, especially in areas 
dominated by subsistence production. For example, in Ghana’s arid rural savannah zone, 
the population relies almost entirely on subsistence production with little agroprocessing, 
few opportunities for diversifying into nonfarm income, and weak infrastructure. 
Therefore, despite relatively high levels of national growth in Ghana, this region only   44
experienced a slight decline in its poverty headcount from 73 in 1991 to 70 percent in 
1999. 
Table 5.  Comparison of staples and exportable agricultural growth scenarios 






Ethiopia (2003-2015)   
     Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  0.5 2.4  2.4
     Annual GDP growth rate (%)  3.1 5.0  5.0
          Agriculture  2.5 5.0  5.0
               Staples crops  2.0 5.0  1.9
               Export crops  4.0 4.4  18.0
     Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  44.3 27.2  31.6
     Difference in poor population in 2015 (1000)  -15,279  -11,313
     Poverty-growth elasticity  - -1.80  -1.40
Ghana (2003-2015)   
     Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)  2.2 3.4  3.4
     Annual GDP growth rate (%)  4.7 6.0  6.0
          Agriculture
  4.6 7.7 7.7
               Staples crops
  4.6 8.5 3.7
               Export crops  4.1 3.4  18.4
     Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  23.7 14.0  22.9
     Difference in poor population in 2015 (1000)  -2,615  -211
     Poverty-growth elasticity  -1.50 -2.10  -1.10
Uganda (1999-2015)   
     Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)   
     Annual GDP growth rate (%)  5.2 6.4  6.4
          Agriculture  5.1 7.7  7.9
               Staples crops  5.1 9.0  5.0
               Export crops  4.4 -1.6  19.7
     Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  27.8 18.6  19.0
     Difference in poor population in 2015 (1000)  -3,602  -3,445
     Poverty-growth elasticity  -0.98 -1.40  -1.39
Zambia (2001-2015)   
     Annual per capita GDP growth rate (%)   
     Annual GDP growth rate (%)  4.0 5.0  5.0
          Agriculture  4.6 7.8  7.1
               Staples crops  4.1 7.9  4.0
               Export crops  10.2 6.9  22.8
     Poverty headcount by 2015 (%)  68.3 59.2  62.0
     Difference in poor population in 2015 (1000)  -1,210  -842
     Poverty-growth elasticity  -0.35 -0.57  -0.47
Source: Authors’ simulations and calculations. 
Note: Given that exportable sector is too small in Rwanda, we do not include Rwanda in these simulations 
1. Livestock is included  
2. Only nontraditional exportable crops are included   45
Poor infrastructure and limited access to input and output markets also pose 
severe constraints for small farmers to access new technology and improve both land and 
labor productivity. Poor market conditions and high transportation costs often imply that 
increased food production will simply lower the price that farmers received for their 
produce. This further reduces the incentive to adopt the high yield/productivity 
technology often required for intensive use of purchased inputs. Findings from the 
Ethiopian and Zambian economy-wide models suggest that if staples growth is combined 
with a lowering of transaction costs through public investments, then poverty reduction 
would be substantially improved (Diao et al. 2005; Thurlow and Wobst 2004). 
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IV.  THE WAY FORWARD FOR AFRICAN AGRICULTURE 
Economic theory, cross-country empirical studies, and the success of the Green 
Revolution in Asia all confirm that agriculture can play a critical role in the development 
process. Indeed, in much of the development literature, agricultural growth has been 
viewed as a pre-condition for industrialization because the sector provides surplus labor 
to industry, savings for capital investment in nonagriculture, and more food to meet the 
increasing demand of a growing nonagricultural labor force, without which labor costs in 
the industrial sector must rise.  As the largest employer in most developing countries, 
agricultural growth also has a large impact on poverty reduction by creating income 
opportunities for the poor in both the farm and nonfarm economy while lowering food 
prices for poor rural and urban consumers. By increasing food security, agriculture also 
improves nutrition and in turn promotes productivity. At the same time, it decreases a 
country’s dependence on imported food, which often cannot be obtained without 
sufficient and stable levels of foreign exchange. Finally, the unique decision-making 
processes associated with smallholder agriculture can stimulate broader growth by 
fostering the processes of learning and innovation. 
Agriculture’s pro-growth and pro-poor performance depends on small farms 
being in the vanguard. Small farms dominate agriculture in many developing countries, 
and the transformation from traditional to modern agriculture is based on the efficiency 
of small farms and their transformation from subsistence to market activities. In an 
increasingly globalized world, however, small farms face a number of new challenges in 
terms of accessing market opportunities. Particularly in Africa, where an agricultural 
transformation comparable to Asia’s or Latin America’s has yet to occur, there is 
skepticism that an agriculture-led strategy in general, and a small farms one in particular, 
is a viable approach.  Nevertheless, there is little evidence or theory to suggest the 
superiority of other strategies, such as bypassing agriculture straight to industrialization 
or encouraging migration to urban areas.  Indeed, proponents of such strategies fail to 
explain how they will tackle the rising food costs and high urban un- and under-  47
employment that would inevitably result in countries with small and insulated industrial 
sectors.  
The importance of agriculture as a driving force for African development is 
highlighted in the typology presented in Table 2. More than 70 percent of low-income 
African countries have favorable agricultural conditions, and agriculture comprises more 
than a third of GDP in two-thirds of these countries. Even in those countries where 
agriculture is a smaller component of GDP, smallholder farming often represents the 
dominant livelihood for the poorest households.  By examining the experience of five 
countries during the 1990s, some commonalities emerged despite variations in the 
countries’ development levels and mineral resource endowments. Confirming much of 
the development theory discussed in Section II, agricultural growth in these countries 
creates greater linkages and hence generates more poverty reduction than growth in the 
nonagricultural sector alone. Overall though, increased productivity in agriculture and 
nonagriculture together offers the greatest prospects for generating broad, economic 
development and decreasing poverty.    
While much of the early development theory did not examine variations in growth 
and poverty-reduction potential within the agricultural sector, these differences were 
evident in the case studies. Growth in traditional and nontraditional, high-value exports 
can significantly contribute to farmers’ incomes in those areas with good irrigation and 
convenient access to markets. Yet, in all five countries, staples growth consistently 
offered more poverty reduction than any of the other subsectors. For most African 
countries, especially those with large populations such as Ethiopia, agricultural and other 
economic growth will depend on growth in domestic markets.  Domestic demand on 
staple foods, which provide the bulk of that market, is projected to double within the next 
15 years (Diao and Hazell 2004). Increases in farm income obtained by capturing such 
market opportunities will be greater than those offered by niche markets.   
Yet, how can agriculture’s potential be translated into a reality? A number of 
studies have identified the preconditions for an agricultural transformation. On the   48
supply-side, innovations in science and technology are necessary to counter erratic 
rainfall, declining soil fertility, and production growth due to land expansion rather than 
technical change. This is perhaps most crucial in many African countries in which 
agricultural growth often resulted from land expansion. Lack of profit opportunities in the 
technology for food grains and inputs for small-scale agriculture often deters the private 
sector in the early stage of development, and hence, public investments in agricultural 
R&D are needed. Evidence from rural Uganda indicates that public investments in 
agricultural R&D had the highest impact on poverty reduction throughout the 1990s (Fan 
and Rao 2004). In addition to financial resources, agricultural innovation requires human 
capital and, therefore, sustaining and improving upon advances in agricultural R&D 
requires concurrent investments in general education (Hayami and Ruttan 1985).      
As the case studies highlight, greater public investment in rural infrastructure is 
also necessary in order to increase consumer demand and farmers’ access to input and 
output markets, stimulate the rural nonfarm economy and rural towns, and more fully 
integrate the poorest regions into their countries’ economies.  As shown by Fan et al. 
(2004) for rural Uganda, infrastructure investments do not have to be excessive to have a 
sizeable impact.  Indeed, dollar for dollar, investments in feeder roads reduced the 
number of poor Ugandans by over three times as much as investments in more costly 
murram or tarmac roads. Public investment in rural infrastructure also demonstrates a 
‘crowding-in’ effect on private investment, which in the absence of rural infrastructure is 
much less profitable (Timmer 2002).    
Many skeptics believe that the enormity of investments and policy changes 
needed to ensure agricultural growth in Africa justify bypassing the sector.  Yet, there are 
two reasons to dismiss this pessimism. First, as highlighted by Gabre-Madhin and 
Haggblade (2004), there have been notable successes in African agriculture in terms of 
increased R&D, improved environmental conservation techniques, and the seizing of new 
market opportunities.  Secondly, many of these investments and policies are also essential 
to stimulate growth in sectors outside of agriculture and, therefore, are unavoidable if the   49
intention is to create broad, economic development. In the past, the necessary 
components for agricultural growth were largely neglected in favor of capital-intensive, 
fast-track industrialization strategies. While new challenges face the sector today, they 
must be tackled rather than ignored in order to ensure that millions of Africans finally 
have a pathway out of poverty.    50
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APPENDIX:  DATA SOURCES AND MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
Two different types of models are used in this study: economy-wide multimarket 
models (Ethiopia, Ghana and Rwanda) and computable general equilibrium models 
(Uganda and Zambia). However, the models of the five case study countries differ 
according to both their specification and the disaggregation of the data used to calibrate 
them. This first section of the appendix identifies the different sectors and commodities 
used in the models, while subsequent sections review the general specifications of the 
economy-wide multimarket model (EMM) and the computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model.  
Data Sources and Aggregation for the Economy-wide, Multimarket (EMM) and CGE 
Models 
The EMM places greater emphasis on capturing the detailed structure of the 
agricultural sector. This can be seen in Table A1, which shows that of the 34 sectors 
identified in the Ethiopian EMM model, 32 of these are agricultural sectors. By contrast, 
the disaggregation of the CGE models is more evenly balanced across agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors. For example, of the 27 sectors in the Zambian model, 13 are 
agricultural sectors, 9 are industrial sectors, and 5 are service sectors. However, while the 
CGE models are better at capturing cross-sector growth-linkages during the production 
process, they sacrifice information on the detailed production technologies used in the 
various agricultural sectors. These differences may not prove too significant, however, 
since consumption linkages outweigh production linkages in most developing countries 
during their early stages of development (Vogel 1994). The ability to capture detailed 
consumption linkages depends largely on the disaggregation of households’ income and 
expenditure patterns. In this regard, all of the models have highly disaggregated 
representative households in the models and are linked directly to the household survey 
to ensure that the most detailed household information is retained. 
The models are also disaggregated across regions within each country in order to 
capture the geographic heterogeneity of sectors and households. In this regard, the EMM   62
models are considerably more disaggregated than the CGE models. However, both types 
of models are constrained by the representativity of the underlying household and 
production data and so cannot present results beyond the main administrative provincial 
or regional levels.  
Specification of the Economy-wide Multimarket (EMM) Models 
Nontechnical Description and General Assumptions 
Only the specification of the Ethiopian model is presented since the models for 
Ghana and Rwanda are similar in structure. The EMM model is based on neoclassic 
microeconomic theory. In the model, there are representative producers who are 
aggregated to represent the zonal level production for both rural and urban areas. The 
supply functions that are derived from producer-profit maximization are functions of 
producer prices across 34 commodities. In the agricultural sector, supply functions have 
two components: (i) yield and area functions and (ii) land allocation responsive to 
changing profitability across different crops given total land available in the period. 
Representative consumers are aggregated from the household survey data to 
represent an average household’s consumption pattern at the zonal level, again with a 
rural and urban disaggregation. The demand functions derived from utility maximization 
depend on prices and income. Income is generated from both agricultural and 
nonagricultural activities and is an endogenous variable that links supply with demand as 
in a typical general equilibrium model. 
As the name of the model suggests, a multiple market structure is specified. There 
is perfect substitution between domestically and internationally produced commodities. 
However, transportation and other market costs distinguish trade in the domestic market 
from imports and exports. For example, even though imported maize is assumed to be 
perfectly substitutable with domestically produced maize in consumers’ demand 
functions, due to high transportation and other market costs, maize may not be profitable   63
to import if the domestic price for maize is lower than the border price of maize less any 
transactions costs. Maize imports can only occur when the domestic demand for maize  
Table A1.  Sectors, Households and Regions in the Models 
Ethiopia   Economy-wide Multimarket Model 
   Agriculture   
 Staple 
 crops 
Maize; Teff; Wheat; Sorghum; Barley; Millet; Oats; Rice; Potatoes; Beans; 
Peas; Other pulses; Groundnuts; Rapeseed; Sesame; Other oil crops; 
Domestic vegetables; Bananas; Other domestic fruits 
 Export 
 crops 
Exportable vegetables; Other horticultural crops; Chat; Cotton; Coffee; 
Sugar; Beverages and spices 
  Other  Bovine meat; Goat meat and mutton; Other meat; Dairy products; Poultry; 
Fish 
   Nonagriculture   
 Industry  Industry 
 Services  Services 
  Regions  56 nationally-defined zones 
  Households  112 aggregate households representing rural and urban in 56 zones 
  Data sources  Agricultural Sample Survey, 1997/98-2000/2001  (Central Statistics 
Authority) 
Agricultural Sample Enumeration, 2001/2002  (Central Statistics Authority) 
Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey, 1999/2000  
(HICES)  
Ethiopia Statistical Abstract, 2003  (Central Statistics Authority) 
Statistical Database, 2004  (Ethiopian Economic Association) 
FAOSTAT (for agriculture) and World Bank (for sector GDP) 
Ghana  Economy-wide Multimarket Model 
   Agriculture   
 Staple 
 crops 
Maize; Rice; Wheat; Sorghum and millet; Cassava; Yam; Cocoyam; 
Plantains; Groundnut; Beans 
 Export 
 crops 
Cotton; Nuts; Exportable vegetables; Pineapple; Coconut; Other exportable 
fruits;  Sugar; Cocoa bean; Coffee; Oil palm; Tobacco; Rubber; Wood 
 Other  Domestically-consumed  vegetables; Domestically-consumed fruits; Beef; 
Poultry; Mutton meat; Pig meat; Other meat; Fish; Eggs; Milk   
   Nonagriculture   
  Industry  Cocoa processing; Fish processing; Other food processing; Mines; Other 
manufacturing; Electricity and water; Construction 
  Services  Transportation services; Trade;  Finance; Government; Community services 
  Regions  10 nationally-defined regions 
  Households  20 aggregate households representing rural and urban in 10 regions 
  Data sources  Ghana Living Standards Survey 4, 1998/99 (GLSS4) (Ghana Statistical 
Service) 
Agriculture in Ghana, Facts and Figures (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
2003) 
FAOSTAT (for agriculture) and World Bank and IMF (for sector GDP and 
trade)   64
Table A1 contd.  Sectors, Households and Regions in the Models 
Rwanda  Economy-wide Multimarket Model 
   Agriculture   
 Staple 
 crops 
Maize; Rice; Wheat; Sorghum; Cassava; Potatoes; Sweet potatoes; Other 




  Other  Peanuts; Soybeans; Vegetable oil; Vegetables; Fruits; Sugar; Beverage; 
Beef; Mutton; Poultry; Other meat; Fish; Eggs; Milk 
   Nonagriculture   
  Industry  Home processing; Industry 
 Services  Services 
 Regions  11  nationally-defined provinces plus 1 capital city 
  Households  48 aggregate households representing rural and urban in 12 regions by 
gender of household heads 
  Data sources  Household Living Condition Survey, 1999-2001  (EICV)  
Agricultural Statistics, 1998-2002  (Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Resources and Forestry) 
FAOSTAT (for agriculture) and World Bank and IMF (for sector GDP and 
trade) 
Uganda  Computable General Equilibrium Model 
   Agriculture   
 Staple 
 crops 




Coffee; Cash crops 
  Other  Livestock; Forestry; Fishing 
   Nonagriculture   
  Industry  Meat; Coffee processing; Milling; Beverages and tobacco; Textiles; Other 
manufacturing; Fertilizer; Petroleum; Energy; Construction 
  Services  Trade services; Transport services; Private services; Public services 
  Regions  6 IFPRI-defined development domains (see Pender et al., 2001) 
  Households  9 representative households: urban (poor and nonpoor households); and 
rural (across the 6 agro-ecological zones and one nonfarm household). 
  Data sources  Uganda National Household Survey, 1999  (UNHS-1) 
Uganda Social Accounting Matrix, 1999  (IFPRI) 
World Bank (for sector GDP, population and labor force trends) 
FAOSTAT (for trends in agricultural yields) 
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Table A1 contd.  Sectors, Households and Regions in the Models 
Zambia  Computable General Equilibrium Model 
   Agriculture   
 Staple 
 crops 
Maize; Millet and sorghum; Groundnuts; Wheat; Horticulture; Other crops 
 Export 
 crops 
Sugar; Cotton; Tobacco; Coffee 
  Other  Livestock; Fisheries; Forestry 
   Nonagriculture   
  Industry  Mining; Food, beverages and tobacco; Textiles and garments; Wood and 
paper; Fertilizer and chemicals; Other manufacturing; Electricity and water; 
Capital goods; Construction 
  Services  Trade and transport; Hotel and catering; Community services; Financial 
services; Public services 
  Regions  9 nationally-defined provinces  
  Households  73 representative households: by 9 provinces; rural (small, medium, large-
scale and nonfarm households); and urban (low, medium and high cost of 
living areas) 
  Data sources  Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, 1998 (LCMS II) 
Zambia Social Accounting Matrix, 2001 (IFPRI) 
IMF (for population and labor force trends) and World Bank (for GDP 
trends) 
FAOSTAT (for trends in agricultural yields) 
 
increases faster than the growth in domestic supply of maize and the domestic market 
price rises significantly. A similar situation is assumed for exported commodities. Even 
though certain horticultural products are exportable, if domestic production is not 
competitive in international markets, either due to low productivity or high market 
transportation costs, then exports will not be profitable.  In other words, only when 
domestic producer prices plus market costs are lower than the border price of the same 
product does it become profitable to export.  
The model does not capture bilateral trade flows across subnational regions, 
although it does identify a zone as being in food surplus or deficit by comparing zonal 
level demand and supply for total food commodities. While producers and consumers in 
different zones operate in the same national markets for specific commodities, prices can 
vary across regions due to differences in transportation and market costs. For example, 
domestic marketing margins are defined at the zonal level according to the distance from   66
each zone to Addis Ababa, which represents the central market for the country. For a 
food surplus region, food crop prices faced by local producers are equal to the prices in 
the central market subtracting market margins, while for a food deficit region local prices 
are higher than those in the central market due to marketing margins. 
To analyze the growth-poverty effect, the nationally-defined poverty line is 
adopted in the models rather than using the World Bank’s ‘a-dollar-a-day’ measure.
15 
National poverty lines are typically measured by total household expenditure rather than 
income, since income is often significantly underreported in developing countries. 
However, changes in the representative households’ expenditures in the EMM model are 
the results of changes in their incomes (that is, both expenditures and incomes are 
endogenous variables in the models). 
A microsimulation model is used to fully capture consumption patterns at the 
detailed household level. The Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey 
(HICES), 1999/2000 is used in the microsimulation model, which is linked with the 
EMM model. More specifically, each household in the microsimulation model 
(equivalent to the HICE data set) links with its corresponding representative consumers in 
the EMM model, which in turn are defined at the zonal level for both rural and urban 
areas. There are 56 zones in the Ethiopia EMM model, and after further disaggregating 
across rural and urban areas, there are a total of 112 aggregate households. Taking a 
single household, “rural West Tigray” as an example, this aggregate household in the 
EMM model is an aggregation of 143 sample rural households in the HICES, weighted 
by their sample weights (which range from 903 to 1359).  
A top-down linkage is defined from the EMM model to the microsimulation 
model. If results from the EMM model indicate that a 1 percent increase in per capita 
GDP causes a 1.3 percent increase in annual spending on teff for the “rural West Tigray” 
                                                 
15 National poverty lines are preferable since they account for country-specificity in defining poverty. As 
was the case in constructing the typology, the dollar-a-day poverty measure is only used for cross-country 
comparison.   67
household in the EMM model, then there will be a 1.3 percent increase in spending on 
teff by all the 143 sample households it represents in the microsimulation model. 
However, the share of teff in each of the 143 households’ total expenditure varies. 
Therefore, the 1.3 percent increase will affect each of the 143 households differently 
depending on the budget share of teff in their consumption basket. The effect on total 
household expenditure will be larger for a household that spends more of its income on 
teff than for others who spend less. These differential effects occur across all 34 
commodities included in the EMM model. It is by these differential effects that the EMM 
model, together with the microsimulation model, is able to estimate national 
distributional change. 
In general, because of the larger share of staple food in poor households’ budgets, 
the same income elasticity for all rural households can result in different aggregate 
effects on total expenditures across households. Given a fixed poverty line defined by the 
real expenditure (for example, $96 per year per capita for rural households in Ethiopia), 
some poor households whose per capita expenditure is initially below the poverty line 
may move out of poverty in a certain year if their expenditure rises above the poverty line 
in the simulation for this year. Using the microsimulation model, the national poverty 
rates are recalculated according to updated total expenditure for each sample household 
(taking into account its weight) for each year in a simulation. 
Mathematical Specification  
(i) Supply  Functions 
Yield Function (for crops) 
q
i Z R
t i Z R
q q
t i Z R P Y
, ,
, , , t Z,i, R, , , , YA
α = , (1) 
where
q
t i Z R Y , , ,  is the yield for crop i with technology q in region R (total 11 regions) and 
zone Z (total 56 zones) at time period t, and PR,Z,i is the producer price for i and can be 
different across regions or zones. 
q
t i Z R YA , , ,  is the productivity shift parameter, which varies   68
according to different technologies, q. 
q
t i Z R , , , YA could be estimated as a function of 
modern inputs, such as irrigation, fertilizer, and improved seed, were more data available. 
Currently, the model only captures the mean difference across technologies. There are a 
total of 15 different technologies for the major (mainly cereal) crops, which implies that 
there are 15 yield functions per crop per zone; maize, for example, is characterized by the 
different level of
q
t i Z R , , , YA , which changes over time: 
( )
i Z R Y
r q
t i Z R g
, , 1 YA YA t Z,i, R, 1 , , , + = + , (2) 
where
i Z R Y g
, , is the annual productivity growth rate. 
Area Function (for crops) 
0 , AA , , , , , t i, Z, R, , , ,
, , = = ∑ ∏
J
j
j Z R j t j Z R
q q
t i Z R and P A
j Z R β
β , (3) 
where
q
t i Z R A , , , is the area for crop i with technology q, and P1, P2, … PJ, are the producer 
prices for all commodities; 
q
t i Z R , , , AA  is the shift parameter, which captures the area 
expansion: 
( )
i Z R A
q
t i Z R g
, , 1 AA AA
q
t i, Z, R, 1 , , , + = + , (4) 
where 
i Z R A g
, , is the annual area expansion rate for crop i with technology q. Given that 
most prices are endogenous in the model, area functions, similar to the supply functions 
for noncrop production, capture cross-sector linkages among crops, between crop and 
noncrop agriculture (such as livestock), and between agriculture and nonagriculture.  
Total Supply of Crops 
q
t i Z R
q
t i Z R q t i Z R A Y S , , , , , , , , , ⋅ =∑ . (5)   69
Supply Function for Noncrop Sectors (livestock and nonagriculture) 
∏ =
j t j Z R
LV
t i Z R
LV




t i, Z, R, , , , SA
β . (6) 
Trends in the livestock and nonagricultural supply function are represented by: 
( )
i Z R S g
, , 1 SA SA
LV
t i, Z, R,
LV
1 t i, Z, R, + = + , (7) 
where 
i Z R S g
, ,  is the annual growth rate of livestock and nonagricultural productivity and 
varies by region or zone and commodity, and gY, gA, and gS are exogenous variables in 
the model. 
With regional disaggregation and commodity details, it is infeasible to estimate 
the supply elasticities used in the model. Thus, a modest own-price elasticity of 0.2 is 
chosen for the supply function.
16 The negative cross-price elasticities in the function are 
then derived from the own-price elasticity multiplied by the value share of each 
commodity (at the zonal level). The homogeneity of degree zero condition is imposed on 
the supply function such that, within each time period, there is no area allocation 
response if all prices change proportionally. The other constraint on crop area function is 
imposed to avoid a simultaneous expansion of all crop areas over a given time period. 
(ii) Demand  Functions 
Zonal level per capita demand is a function of prices and income: 
I
i Z R j i Z R
t Z R j t j Z R t i Z R GDPpc PC Dpc
, , , , ,
, , , , , , , ,
ε ε ∏ = , (8) 
where DpcR,Z,i is per capita demand for commodity i in region R and zone Z, and PCR,Z,j is 
the consumer price for j in region R and zone Z. j = 1,2,…,36 (including two aggregate 
nonagricultural goods.) GDPpcR,Z is per capita income for region R and zone Z’s rural or 
                                                 
16 Using an aggregate, normalized quadratic profit function (at mean values of prices and fixed factors) 
Abrar, Morrissey, and Rayner (2004) estimate the own-price elasticity of output to be around 0.013 in dual 
and 0.08 in primal, which are significant. As an aggregate profit function is considered, the substitution 
possibility is abstracted.    70
urban consumers.  j i Z R , , , ε is price elasticity between demand for commodity i and price for 
commodity  j, and 
I




i Z R j i Z R ε ε  and 




j Z R j Z R sh ε  where  i Z R sh , , is the expenditure share of commodity i. Income 
elasticity is estimated using HICES data for the rural and urban. Due to the constraint of 
sample size, estimation at the subnational level is not significant, and hence, we assume 
similar income elasticity for all the rural households and a similar one for all the urban 
households. The price elasticities are calculated from the above two constraint equations, 
with an assumption on the subsistence consumption level for each commodity.  
(iii)  Relationship Between Producer and Consumer Prices 
It is assumed that import and export parity prices are the border prices adjusted by 
trade margins. National market prices are represented by the prices in Addis Ababa, 
while prices at the zonal level are linked to, but different from, national market prices. 
Prices are higher in the food deficit area and lower in the food surplus area compared 
with national market prices. The farther the zone from the nearest major market centers, 
the lower the prices. The difference between zonal-level prices and those at national 
markets is defined as regional market margins. Specifically, for imported commodities, 
the following relationship exists between import parity prices and consumer prices in 
national markets: 
( ) i i
Addis
t i PWM Wm PC ⋅ + = 1 , , (9) 
where Wmi is the trade margin between border prices, PWMi, and consumer prices, PCi, 
in national markets when commodity i is importable. The relationship between zonal-
level and national market prices (for consumer prices) is as follows: 
( )
Addis
t i i Z R t i Z R PC Dgap PC , , , , , , 1 ⋅ + = , (10) 
where  i Z R Dgap , , is negative if Z is in the food surplus area and positive if Z is in the food 
deficit area.   71
National market prices and export parity prices for exportable commodities have 
the following relationship: 
( ) i i
Addis
t i PWE Wm P ⋅ − = 1 , , (11) 
where P is producer prices and PWE is border prices; the equation holds only 
when commodity i is exportable. Consumer and producer prices are not necessarily the 
same, such that: 
( ) t i Z R i Z R t i Z R P Dm PC , , , , , , , , 1 ⋅ + = ,   (12) 
where  Dm is the margin between consumer and producer prices. The following 
relationship exists between domestic market and import/export parity prices for 
nontradable commodities: 




t i i i PWM Wm PC P PWE Wm ⋅ + < ≤ < ⋅ − 1 ) 1 ( , , . (13) 
(iv)  Exports and Imports 
Trade (either in imports or exports) is determined by the difference between 
national market prices and import/export parity prices, that is, where 
( ) ; 0    , 1 , > ⋅ − = t i i i
Addis
i,t E PWE Wm P  (14) 
otherwise, Ei,t  = 0. Ei is exports of commodity i; and if  
( ) ; 0    , arg 1 , , > ⋅ + = t i i i
Addis
t i M PWM in Wm PC    (15) 
otherwise, Mi,t  = 0. Mi is imports of commodity i. 
Notice that Ei and M i can be zero in the early stages in the model; hence, the 
prices for nontraded goods are endogenously determined. If the domestic consumer 
prices, PCi, rise over time (but not the border prices) due to increased demand more than 
the increased supply, PCi starts to approach  i i PWM Wm ) 1 ( + . 
Once i i i PWM Wm PC ) 1 ( + = , imports occur for commodity i, and PC is linked to PWM, 
which is exogenous. A similar but opposite situation holds for Pi, that is, if P falls over 
time such that i i i PWE Wm P ) 1 ( − = , exports occur and P is linked to PWE.   72
(v)  Regional Crop Deficit and Surplus 
The model can identify which zones are food deficit or food surplus, but it cannot 
identify trade flows among zones. That is, total deficits and surpluses are cleared 
(balanced) in the national market and no regional differential market exists. Crop i is in 
deficit (surplus) if the following equation is positive (negative): 
t i Z R t Z R t i Z R t i Z R S PoP Dpc DEF , , , , , , , , , , , − ⋅ = . (16) 
(vi)  Balance of Demand and Supply at the National Level 
∑ ∑ ⋅ = − +
Z R Z R t i Z R t i t i t i Z R Z R PoP Dpc E M S
, , , , , , , , , , , . (17) 
This equation solves for the price of commodity i if both M and E are zero. 
Otherwise, it solves for the value of M or E.  
(vii)  GDP and Per Capita Zonal Income Function 
Income in the model is endogenous and determined by production revenues. 
Given that the model does not explicitly include input and, hence, the costs of input, the 
prices for agricultural commodities are adjusted such that the sector production revenues 
are close to the value-added for this sector: 
∑ ⋅ =
j t j Z R t j Z R t Z R S P GDP .   , , , , , , , , . (18) 
Income per capita: 
t Z R
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(viii)  Poverty Population and Poverty Rate 
Let 
rur PoorInc  be the (per capita) poverty line expenditure for rural areas and 
rur
t Z R GDP , , be total rural income in region R and zone Z at time t; let
rur
h Z R Sh , , be income share 
for rural household group h in region R and zone Z; the population 
rur
t h Z R Pop , , ,  of   73
household group h equals the sample weights multiplied by the household size, 
represented by the sample household for group h updated with the population growth 
rate. Hence, the income of household group h is defined as: 
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For the population
rur
t h Z R Pop , , ,  in group h is in the poor if . , , ,
rur rur
t h Z R PoorInc Ipc <  (22) 
Two factors affect 
rur
t h Z R I , , ,  in the simulations, 
rur
t Z R GDP , , and  . , , , ,
rur
t i h Z R Dpc While 
rur
t Z R GDP , , is directly solved from the EMM model, and changes in 
rur
t i h Z R Dpc , , , , is assumed to 
be proportional to the same commodity consumed by the representative rural household 
in the same zone. For example, if consumption of teff increases by 1.3 percent at t = 2006 
for the rural household in zone of West Tigray due to increase in 
rur
t Z R GDP , , for R = Tigray, 
Z = West Tigray, and t = 2006, then there is a 1.3 percent increase in the spending on teff 
in all the 143 sample households in the rural West Tigray household represented in the 
microsimulation model, that is, an increase in
rur
t i h Z R Dpc , , , ,  for R = Tigray, Z = West Tigray, 
h = households represented by the rural West Tigray, i = teff, and t = 2006. However, the 
share of teff in each of the 143 households’ total expenditure varies. Therefore, the 1.3 
percent increase in teff expenditure will affect each of the 143 households differently 
depending on the budget share of teff in their consumption basket, that is,
rur
t h Z R I , , ,  varies by 
households in the simulations. The effect on total household expenditure, 
rur
t h Z R I , , , , will be 
larger for a household that spends more of its income on teff than for others who spend 
less income on teff. These differential effects occur across all the 34 commodities 
included in the EMM model. With such changes, a household whose family members’   74
total expenditure, 
rur
h Z R Ipc 0 , , , , is lower than 
rur PoorInc initially, it is possible for it to move 
out off the poverty, if its family members’ total expenditure, 
rur
h Z R Ipc 0 , , , , higher than 
rur PoorInc at t = 2006, i.e.,  . 2006 , , ,
rur rur
h Z R PoorInc Ipc >  
The new poverty population in the rural area is the sum of 
rur
t h Z R Pop , , , over h for all 
h with 
rur rur
t h Z R PoorInc Ipc < , , , . The poverty rate is calculated by the ratio of this number 
over the total rural population. The urban poverty population and poverty rate can be 
defined using a similar method. As poverty population is defined at the household group 
level, the poverty rate can easily be calculated at a specific subnational level, such as for 
the food deficit area or country as a whole. 
Specification of the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Models 
The poverty and distributional impact of alternative development strategies is 
modeled in Uganda and Zambia using an extended version of the static CGE model 
described in Lofgren et al. (2001) and the recursive dynamic CGE model described in 
Robinson and Thurlow (2004). The extensions include (i) the explicit disaggregation of 
economic activities at the regional level, (ii) imperfect and nested labor and land markets, 
and (iii) considerable disaggregation of households according to the economic and social 
characteristics. This class of model developed from the neoclassical modeling tradition 
originally presented in Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982). Since both countries’ CGE 
models are built on a similar model structure, only the Zambian CGE model is described 
in this appendix. The structure of the Ugandan model is outlined in Table A1. 
 Nontechnical Description and General Assumptions 
In accordance with the Zambian social accounting matrix (SAM), the model 
distinguishes between 27 sectors/commodities. However, given the explicit specification 
of subregions in the model, there are a total of 243 productive activities (that is, 27 
sectors by nine provinces). While production activities are defined at the regional or 
provincial level, an integrated national market for commodities is assumed. That is, the   75
model does not capture interregional trade within the country. Imperfect factor markets 
are assumed for land and unskilled labor, and the markets for these factors are defined at 
the regional or provincial level (that is, there is no free movement of factors between 
regions). By contrast, national capital is mobile across regions. There are three kinds of 
capital distinguished in the model: agricultural, mining, and other nonagricultural capital. 
The 243 representative producers in the model make decisions in order to maximize 
profits, but are constrained by factor market imperfections when choosing inputs. A two-
level production system is employed. At the lower level, a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function is defined over factors, while at the higher level, fixed-share 
intermediates are combined with the value-added in a Leontief specification. Profit 
maximization implies that the factors receive income where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost based on endogenous relative prices. 
Substitution possibilities also exist between production for the domestic and the 
foreign markets. This decision of producers is governed by a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function which distinguishes between exported and domestic 
goods, and by doing so captures any time or quality differences between the two 
products. Profit maximization drives producers to sell in those markets where they can 
achieve the highest returns. These returns are based on domestic and export prices (where 
the latter is determined by the world price times the exchange rate adjusted for any taxes). 
Under the small-country assumption, Zambia is assumed to face a perfectly elastic world 
demand at fixed world prices. The final ratio of exports to domestic goods is determined 
by the endogenous interaction of relative prices for these two commodity types. 
Further substitution possibilities exist between imported and domestic goods 
under a CES Armington specification. Such substitution can take place both in final and 
intermediates usage. The Armington elasticities vary across sectors, with lower 
elasticities reflecting greater differences between domestic and imported goods. Again 
under the small country assumption, Zambia is assumed to face infinitely elastic world 
supply at fixed world prices. The final ratio of imports to domestic goods is determined   76
by the cost minimizing decision-making of domestic demanders based on the relative 
prices of imports and domestic goods (both of which include relevant taxes).  
The model distinguishes between various ‘institutions’ within the Zambian 
economy, including enterprises, the government, and many representative households. 
These households are derived from the national household survey by aggregating across 
the nine provinces and, within each province, according to other socioeconomic 
characteristics. In total there are 63 aggregate households in the model (Table A1). 
Households and enterprises receive income in payment for producers’ use of their factors 
of production. Both institutions pay direct taxes to government (based on fixed tax rates), 
save (based on marginal propensities to save), and make transfers to the rest of the world. 
Enterprises pay their remaining income to households in the form of dividends. 
Households, unlike enterprises, use their income to consume commodities under a linear 
expenditure system (LES) of demand.  
The government receives income from imposing activity, sales and direct taxes 
and import tariffs, and then makes transfers to households, enterprises, and the rest of the 
world. The government also purchases commodities in the form of government 
consumption expenditure, and the remaining income of government is (dis)saved. All 
savings from households, enterprises, government, and the rest of the world (foreign 
savings) are collected in a savings pool from which investment is financed. 
  The model includes three broad macroeconomic accounts: (i) the savings and 
investment account, (ii) the current account, and (iii) the government balance. In order to 
bring about balance between the various macro accounts, it is necessary to specify a set 
of ‘macroclosure’ rules that provide a mechanism through which macroeconomic balance 
can be achieved. A savings-driven closure was assumed in order to balance the Zambian 
savings-investment account. Under this closure, real investment quantities are fixed, and 
the marginal propensities to save of households and enterprises adjust to ensure that the 
level of investment and savings are equal at equilibrium. For the current account it was 
assumed that a flexible exchange rate adjusts in order to maintain a fixed level of foreign   77
savings. In other words, the external balance is held fixed in foreign currency indicating 
the government is not able to borrow in order to cover additional expenditure. Finally, the 
domestic price index was chosen as the numéraire. In the government account the level of 
direct and indirect tax rates, as well as real government consumption expenditure, are 
held constant. As such the balance on the government budget is assumed to adjust to 
ensure that public expenditures equal receipts.  
On the microeconomic side, firms are assumed always to be on their factor 
demand curves. In the Zambian model it was assumed that all land and labor is fully 
employed and hence is paid a flexible real rental rate or wage under the condition of fixed 
supply. Capital is constrained to be sector-specific and earning flexible activity-specific 
returns. 
In order to account for the full ‘dynamic’ effect of policy and nonpolicy changes, 
the static model described above is extended to a recursive dynamic model in which 
selected parameters are updated based on the modeling of intertemporal behavior and 
results from previous periods. Current economic conditions, such as the availability of 
capital, are endogenously dependent on past outcomes but remain unaffected by forward-
looking expectations. The dynamic model is also exogenously updated to reflect 
demographic and technological changes that are based on observed or separately 
calculated projected trends. Most of these time-trends are taken from the World Bank’s 
Zambian Revised Minimum Standards Model (RMSM) as described in detail in Lofgren 
et al. (2004). 
The process of capital accumulation is modeled endogenously, with previous-
period investment generating new capital stock for the subsequent period. Although the 
allocation of new capital across sectors is influenced by each sector’s initial share of 
aggregate capital income, the final sectoral allocation of capital in the current period is 
dependent on the capital depreciation rate and on sectoral profit-rate differentials from 
the previous period. Sectors with above-average capital returns receive a larger share of   78
the new capital stock than their current share in capital income. The converse is true for 
sectors where capital returns are below average.  
Population growth is exogenously imposed on the model based on separately 
calculated growth projections. It is assumed that a growing population generates a higher 
level of consumption demand and, therefore, raises the supernumerary income level of 
household consumption within the LES demand system. Both labor supply and total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth are updated exogenously based on AIDS-adjusted 
estimates (see Lofgren et al. 2004). Finally, mining production is assumed to be 
predominantly driven by a combination of changes in world demand and prices, and other 
factors external to the model. Accordingly, GDP growth in these sectors and in the world 
price of exports are updated exogenously between periods based on detailed sector-level 
projections (World Bank 2004).  
The dynamic model is solved as a series of equilibria each one representing a 
single year. By imposing the above policy-independent dynamic adjustments, the model 
produces a projected or counterfactual growth path. Policy changes can then be expressed 
in terms of changes in relevant exogenous parameters and the model is re-solved for a 
new series of equilibriums. Differences between the policy-influenced growth path and 
that of the counterfactual can then be interpreted as the economy-wide impact of the 
simulated policy. 
The poverty and distributional impact of sectoral growth are modeled inside the 
same 1998 LCMS household survey that was used to construct the CGE model. As in the 
EMM models, a microsimulation model that fully employs the household survey data is 
linked to the CGE model. Each representative household in the CGE model is linked to 
its corresponding household within the microsimulation model (that is, the households in 
the national survey). Similar to the use of sample weights in the survey, each 
‘representative’ household in the CGE model is an aggregation of a larger number of 
households. Since poverty in this study is defined according to per capita expenditure, 
changes in household expenditure from the CGE model are passed down to the survey,   79
where poverty and inequality are calculated in the same way as described in the EMM 
model. 
Mathematical Specification 
A recursive dynamic CGE model can be separated into within-period and 
between-period components. The former describes a static single-period model in which 
consumers and producers behave myopically without factoring future expectations into 
their current decision-making. The dynamics of the model involve updating the 
subsequent-period’s parameters to reflect either changes that have taken place in the 
current period, such as investment spending, or exogenous changes in the economic 
environment, such as population growth. The mathematical specification of the core 
static model is presented first followed by the dynamics of the model. All variables and 
equations are shown in Tables B2 and B3 at the end of this section of the appendix. The 
mathematical equations forming the static model are broken down into sections. Initially 
the production and price structure of the model is described, which includes the 
determination of import and export demand (Equations 23 to 49). Having generated 
incomes for the factors of production, the description shifts to determining the level of 
institutional incomes and consumption, as well as the remaining components of demand 
(Equations 50 to 59). The third and final block describe the equilibrium conditions 
imposed on the model (Equations 60 to 65). The remaining equations (66 to 71) govern 
the accumulation of capital, which is the endogenous component of the dynamic model.  
Production is characterized by a two-level nesting structure and involves the 
combining of factors and intermediate inputs. Aggregate intermediate quantity and price 
are determined by a Leontief or ‘fixed share’ aggregation of individual intermediate 
commodities. This is shown in Equations 23 and 24, where the aggregate quantity of 
intermediates for an activity ( a QINTA ) is composed of the fixed shares of the individual 
intermediate commodities used in that activity’s production ( ca QINT ). The use of fixed 
coefficients ( ca ica ) (as opposed to allowing substitution between intermediates) follows   80
from the assumption that the intermediate demands of a particular activity are pre-
determined by technology. Since intermediate commodities are purchased in the market, 
the aggregate price of the intermediate inputs ( a PINTA ) for an activity is equal to the 
market price of each intermediate commodity ( c PQ ) multiplied by its share ( ca ica ) in 
total intermediate use. With the exception of nontraded goods, each intermediate 
commodity comes from domestic and foreign sources and, therefore, is treated as a 
composite input. Firms are able to substitute between domestic and foreign intermediate 
inputs through the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function given by Equation 
43.  
Unlike the Leontief treatment of intermediates, factors are combined into a 
composite primary factor under a CES function (Equations 25 and 26), which combines 
the factor demands of an activity ( f a QF ) into an aggregate quantity of value-added 
inputs for that activity ( a QVA ). This allows for substitution between factors when 
determining composite factor inputs. Interfactor substitutability increases when the value 
of 
va
a ρ  (which is a transformation of the elasticity of factor substitution) is reduced. An 
activity’s factor demand is driven by cost-minimization based on the relative prices of 
factors, such that their marginal revenue product equals their marginal cost. The marginal 
cost of the composite factor at the top of the factor demand nest for each sector is equal to 
its marginal revenue product, where marginal cost is the economy-wide average wage 
( f W ) multiplied by a sector-specific distortion term ( fa WFDIST ). Total factor 
productivity (TFP) is reflected by 
va
a α  and factor-specific productivity by 
vaf
f a α .  
Demand for individual factors at lower levels of the nested demand system are 
given in Equations 27 and 28, where the latter is the first-order condition. In these 
equations  ' f  and  '' f  are the lower-level factors. Demand for an individual factor  ' f  in 
a given level of the nested structure is driven by cost-minimization based on the relative 
prices of all factors  '' f both at the same level and with substitution possibilities with  ' f .   81
Substitution possibilities are determined by 
van
fa ρ , which is a transformation of the 
elasticity of factor substitution. 
The composite factor quantities and aggregate intermediate quantities are 
combined under a Leontief specification (Equations 29 and 30) to arrive at a final level of 
output for each activity ( a QA ). This production function is strongly separable, since the 
composite primary factor cannot be substituted for the aggregate intermediate, nor can 
intermediates of one sector be substituted for intermediates of another. This additive 
separability can be seen in Equation 31 where the aggregate price of one unit of output 
from each activity ( a PA ) is calculated as the weighted sum of factor and intermediate 
prices exclusive of producer taxes ( a ta ). 
Since each activity can produce more than a single commodity, Equations 32 and 
33 convert each activity’s output and price into a commodity output ( ac QXAC ) and price 
( ac PXAC ) based on fixed shares ( ac θ ). Conversely, since each commodity can be 
produced by more than one activity, it is necessary to combine these commodities from 
their various sources. Although it is assumed that an activity’s production of commodities 
is fixed by technology, it is assumed that demanders of a commodity are relatively 
indifferent to which activity produced the final commodity. As such, the aggregation of 
commodities across activities is governed by imperfect substitution or a CES function. 
Equations 34 and 35 show the CES aggregation function and its first-order conditions. In 
these equations output from each activity ( ac QXAC ) is combined across activities to form 
a composite commodity output ( c QX ). Similarly the composite output’s price ( c PX ) is 
the aggregation of each activity’s commodity price ( ac PXAC ). 
The output of each commodity is then distributed across domestic and foreign 
markets. Under the small-country assumption, the price of an exported commodity, 
shown in Equation 36, is equal to the commodity’s world export price ( c pwe ) multiplied   82
by the exchange rate (EXR). Furthermore, since the export price represents the amount 
received by producers per unit sold abroad, the transaction costs per unit of output are 
removed from this price. This is equal to the share of transaction costs per commodity 
unit ( c ice ) times the market price at which these transaction commodities are sold ( c PQ ).  
For commodities sold both domestically and abroad, Equations 37 and 38 
represent the constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function determining the 
quantity and price of exported and domestically sold commodities. These equations 
represent the ease at which producers are able to substitute production between the two 
markets. Domestic and foreign commodities become more homogenous as the elasticity 
of transformation increases towards infinity. This imperfect substitution reflects the view 
that a producer can shift small amounts of resources between production for the domestic 
and foreign markets without any loss of productive efficiency. However larger shifts in 
production towards a different market will require the use of factors that are less efficient. 
Thus the CET is concave and the final allocation of a given output is determined by the 
relative domestic and export prices.  
Some commodities are produced solely for the domestic or foreign market. 
Equation 39 allocates production ( c QX ) to one of these markets. In such cases either the 
quantity of goods supplied to the domestic market ( c QD ) or the quantity exported ( c QE ) 
is zero. In Equation 40, the value of output ( cc PX QX ⋅ ) must be equal to either the value 
of exports ( cc PE QE ⋅ ) or the value of domestic sales ( cc PDS QD ⋅ ), where  c PDS  is the 
domestic supply price. In Equation 41 the domestic supply price of a commodity ( c PDS ) 
is converted into the demand price of a domestically produced commodity ( c PDD ) by 
incorporating domestic marketing and trade margins. These are calculated by multiplying 
a commodity’s transactions cost share ( ' cc icd ) by the market price at which the 
transactions commodities are sold ( ' c PQ ).    83
The demand for a commodity can either be satisfied by domestic or foreign 
supply. The price of an imported commodity ( c PM ), shown in Equation 42, is equal to 
the commodity’s world import price ( c pwm ) multiplied by the exchange rate (EXR) and 
any import tariffs ( c tm ). Any additional transactions costs are added, and are equal to the 
share of these costs per commodity unit ( c icm ) multiplied by the market price of these 
transaction commodities ( c PQ ).   
For those commodities that have both domestic and foreign supply, Equations 43 
and 44 represent the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) or Armington function 
determining the final quantity and price of imported ( c QM ) and domestically supplied 
( c QD ) commodities. These two commodities are combined to form a composite 
commodity ( c QQ ) that is then supplied to the market. The elasticity of substitution, 
which is a transformation of 
q
c ρ , represents the ease at which consumers are willing to 
shift demand between domestic and foreign products. Equation 45 applies only to those 
commodities that are solely imported or domestically supplied. This replaces the 
Armington function and ensures that composite supply ( c QQ ) is equal to either domestic 
( c QD ) or foreign supply ( c QM ).  
Equation 46 is the total value of absorption or, alternatively, the total spending on 
a commodity at demander prices. The value of absorption is composed of the final 
composite commodity’s price exclusive of sales taxes ( ( ) 1 cc PQ tq ⋅− ) multiplied by the 
quantity of the composite ( c QQ ). Except for those commodities that are solely exported, 
this value of absorption is equal to the sum of the value of domestic ( cc PDD QD ⋅ ) and 
foreign supply ( cc PM QM ⋅ ). The composite commodity is supplied to the domestic 
market and is purchased at market prices ( c PQ ) to satisfy intermediate ( , ca QINT ), 
household ( , ch QH ), government ( c QG ), and investment ( c QINV ) demand.    84
Transaction services have an additional component of demand generated through 
indirect demand for trade inputs during the import, export and domestic sale of 
commodities (Equation 47). A fixed quantity of trade inputs are used per unit of the 
commodity being traded. These are shown in the equation as  ' cc icm  for imports,  ' cc ice  for 
exports, and  ' cc icd  for domestically supplied commodities. These shares are multiplied 
by the quantity of the traded commodity in order to arrive at the total additional demand 
for transaction services ( c QT ).  
The final two production and price equations (48 and 49) calculate consumer and 
domestic price indices. The consumer price index (CPI ) is equal to the weighted sum of 
the market price of each commodity ( c PQ ), where the weight ( c cwts ) is the share of each 
commodity in the household consumption basket. Similarly, the domestic price index 
(DPI ) is the domestic supply price ( c PDS ) weighted by the share of each commodity in 
total domestic supply ( c dwts ). The consumer price index is used as the numéraire in the 
model, and the domestic price index is used to derive the real exchange rate. The model is 
homogenous of degree zero in prices, since a doubling of the numéraire will leave 
relative prices and, hence, the real allocation of resources, unchanged. 
The equations have so far defined the production and price structure of the model. 
The next block of equations determines the generation of institutional incomes and how 
this in turn generates demand for commodities. The model distinguishes between a 
number of institutions including enterprises, households, and the government. Factor 
employment in the production process generates factor incomes as shown in Equation 50. 
Total income for each factor ( f YF ) is equal to its economy-wide wage ( f WF ) multiplied 
by both the quantity employed ( f a QF ) in each activity and its sector-specific wage-
distortion term ( f a WFDIST ). Factor incomes are then either transferred to domestic 
institutions or to the rest of the world. Equation 51 shows how foreign factor remittances 
measured in domestic prices ( row f trnsfr EXR ⋅ ) are removed from factor incomes, before   85
the remaining income is distributed across domestic institutions based on fixed shares 
( if shif ) to arrive at a total value of factor income for each institution ( if YIF ).  
Direct payments from factors ( if YIF ) only form part of the total income ( i YI ) 
earned by domestic nongovernment institutions. As shown in Equation 52, other income 
sources include transfers received from other institutions ( ' ii TRII ), CPI-indexed transfers 
from the government ( ig o v trnsfr CPI ⋅ ), and domestically-valued transfers from the rest of 
the world ( ir o w trnsfr EXR ⋅ ). Domestic nongovernment institutions make transfers to other 
institutions ( ' ii TRII ) in Equation 53. For example, households make transfers to each 
other, and enterprises transfer dividend income (or indirect capital income) to 
households. The value of these transfers is a fixed share ( ' ii shii ) of the institution’s 
income ( ' i YI ) after paying taxes ( ' i tins ) and savings ( ' i MPS ).  
Having determined households’ income, Equation 54 calculates the amount of 
income available for consumption spending ( h EH ). This is equal to total household 
income less payments for direct taxes ( h tins ), savings ( h MPS ), and the share of income 
transferred to other institutions ( ih shii ). Households maximize a Stone-Geary utility 
function subject to a budget constraint. The resulting first-order condition is referred to as 
a Linear Expenditure System (LES) since spending on individual commodities ( ch QH ) is 
a linear function of total spending ( h EH ). Total household expenditure is distributed 
across commodities in Equation 55. A portion of consumption for each commodity 
(
m
cc h PQ γ ⋅ ) is treated as independent of the level of disposable income available for 
consumption spending. The remaining income is then distributed across commodities 
according to fixed shares (
m
ch β ). Household utility is weakly separable since domestic and 
foreign commodities are imperfectly substitutable. Together with the linear homogeneity 
of the LES demand system, this implies that the consumers’ decisions can be   86
decomposed into ‘two-stage budgeting’. At the first stage consumers maximize the 
Stone-Geary utility function of composite commodities subject to a given level of income 
and composite prices. At the second stage consumers maximize the subutility functions 
subject to the expenditure allocated to each commodity in the first decision stage. 
Fixed investment demand ( c QINV ) across commodities is defined in Equation 56 
as the base-year quantity ( c qinv ) multiplied by an adjustment factor (IADJ ). By using an 
adjustment factor, which has a value of one in the base, the assumption is that the 
commodity composition of the investment bundle remains unchanged as the level of 
investment adjusts. Another component of final demand is government consumption 
spending (Equation 57). This is treated in the same way as investment demand. Base-year 
government spending on commodities ( c qg ) is multiplied by an adjustment factor 
(GADJ ) to arrive at a final level of spending on each commodity ( c QG ). The total value 
of total government spending (EG ) is equal to the market value of government 
consumption spending ( cc PQ QG ⋅ ), as well as CPI-indexed transfers to other institutions 
( ig o v trnsfr CPI ⋅ ) (Equation 58). Government expenditure is financed by government 
revenue (YG ). As shown in Equation 59, income-sources include direct taxes ( i tins ), 
activity taxes ( a ta ), import tariffs ( c tm and  cr tmr ), sales taxes ( c tq ), factor income 
( gov f YF ), and transfers received from the rest of the world ( gov row trnsfr ). Depending on 
changes in government spending, changes in revenues and the deficit can therefore affect 
the level of investment or savings in the economy by influencing the availability of 
loanable funds. The extent to which this is possible depends on the adjustment 
mechanisms in the economy.  
The third block of equations describes system constraints and model closures. 
These equilibrium constraints embody assumptions or ‘closure rules’ determining how 
the macro-economy and commodity and factor markets work. Equilibrium exists in the 
commodity market if total demand equals total supply for each commodity. Equation 60   87
shows how total supply for the composite commodity ( c QQ ) has to equal the sum of 
intermediate demand ( ca QINT ), household consumption ( ch QH ), government 
consumption ( c QG ), investment demand ( c QINV ), changes in inventories ( c qdst ), and 
the indirect demand for transactions services ( c QT ). Inventory demand is treated as 
exogenous in the model and remains fixed at base-year values. Factor market 
equilibrium, as shown in Equation 61, implies that the sum of factor demands across all 
activities ( f a QF ) must equal the total supply of that factor ( f QFS ). Three closures are 
possible for each factor in the model: (i) factors are mobile across sectors but total supply 
is fixed; (ii) factor supply is fixed and factors are immobile across sectors; or (iii) factor 
supply is perfectly elastic at a fixed real wage. In the Ugandan and Zambian models land 
and labor is assumed to be fully employed and mobile across sectors. This allows for 
HIV/AIDS and rapid population growth to be incorporated, which are important for 
Zambia and Uganda respectively. Capital supply is determined dynamically (described 
below) but is immobile across sectors within a given time period, thus reflecting short-
run constraints. 
Macroeconomic closures affect the government balance, the current account 
balance, and the workings of savings and investment in the economy. The government 
balance is shown in Equation 62. Here total government income (YG ) is equal to total 
government spending (EG ) and government savings (GSAV ). If the government budget 
is in deficit, then the value of government savings is negative (i.e., the government is 
borrowing or dis-saving). Three variables embodied in the government account are 
relevant to its macroeconomic closure. These include government savings (GSAV ), the 
level of government spending (GADJ  from Equation 57), and the level of government 
income from the direct taxation of domestic institutions ( i TINS  from Equations 53 and 
54). One of these three variables must be held constant in order for Equation 62 to be 
defined. In the Ugandan and Zambian models the direct tax rates imposed on domestic   88
nongovernment institutions are held fixed thus assuming that the government is 
constrained in raising taxes to cover additional public spending. 
The current account balance is defined in Equation 63. The outflow of foreign 
currency is shown on the left hand side as the sum of import spending ( cc pwm QM ⋅ ) and 
transfers paid to the rest of the world ( row f trnsfr ), both of which are measured in foreign 
currency. In equilibrium this outflow must be matched by an inflow of currency. Total 
inflows include earnings from exports ( cc pwe QE ⋅ ), transfers received from the rest of 
the world ( ir o w trnsfr ), and total foreign savings or borrowing (FSAV ). In order for 
current account equilibrium to be defined either the level of foreign borrowing (FSAV ) 
or the exchange rate (EXR) must be held fixed. In the Ugandan and Zambian models the 
level of foreign savings is fixed, thus assuming that the country cannot borrow to finance 
additional spending. 
The final macroeconomic account reflects the balance between savings and 
investment. In Equation 64, total savings is the sum of private savings from post-tax 
disposable income ( () 1 ii i MPS TINS YI ⋅− ⋅ ), government savings (GSAV ), and foreign 
savings (EXR FSAV ⋅ ). In equilibrium this must equal the combined value of fixed 
investment ( cc PQ QINV ⋅ ) and inventory investment ( cc PQ qdst ⋅ ). Macroeconomic 
closure of this account implies that either investment is savings-driven (with  i MPS  
fixed), or savings is investment-driven (with IADJ fixed). In the Ugandan and Zambian 
models a savings-driven investment closure is adopted in which investment adjusts 
endogenously to the availability of loanable funds. Equation 65 shows how the saving 
rates of domestic nongovernment institutions ( i MPS ) are composed of the base-year rate 
( i mps ) multiplied by a scaling factor (MPSADJ ).  
The description so far has outlined a static version of the CGE model, while the 
remainder of this section describes the dynamic extension of the model. A number of 
exogenous and endogenous changes take place over time and are important for capturing   89
the growth process. Together these changes form a projected or counterfactual growth 
path for the economy. These interperiod adjustments include population and labor force 
growth, capital accumulation, factor productivity changes, and changes in foreign capital 
inflows and government expenditure.  
Population growth is assumed to enter the model through its direct and positive 
affect on the level of private consumption spending. As shown in Equation 55, each 
representative household consumes commodities under a Linear Expenditure System 
(LES) of demand. This system allows for an income-independent level of consumption 
(
m
cc h PQ γ ⋅ ) measured as the market value of each household’s consumption of each 
commodity that is unaffected by changes in disposable income. The remaining terms in 
Equation 55 determine the level of additional consumption demand that adjusts with 
changes in income. During the dynamic updating process and as the population grows, 
the level of each household’s consumption of a particular commodity is adjusted upwards 
to account for greater consumption demand. This is achieved by increasing the quantity 
of income-independent demand (
m
ch γ ) at the rate of population growth.  
The method of updating the relevant parameters to reflect changes in land and 
labor supply in the current model depends on the factor market closure chosen. Since 
land and labor supply is fixed under full employment, total land and labor supply ( f QFS  
in Equation 61) are adjusted upwards each year in the Ugandan and Zambian models to 
reflect exogenously-determined estimates of land and labor force growth. This 
specification allows for the effects of HIV/AIDS and other exogenous demographic 
factors to be taken into account, which the model would otherwise be unable to capture.  
Unlike labor supply all changes in total capital supply are endogenous in the 
dynamic model. In a given time period the total available capital is determined by the 
previous period’s capital stock and investment spending. However, what remains to be 
decided is how the new capital stock resulting from previous investment is to be allocated 
across sectors. An extreme specification of the model would allocate investment in   90
proportion to each sector’s share in aggregate capital income or profits. However, in the 
current dynamic model, these proportions are adjusted by the ratio of each sector’s profit 
rate to the average profit rate for the economy as a whole. Sectors with a higher-than-
average profit rate receive a larger share of investment than their share in aggregate 
profits. This updating process involves four steps.  
Equation 66 describes the first step at which the average economy-wide rental rate 
of capital (
a
f t AWF ) is calculated for time period t. This is equal to the sum of the rental 
rates of each sector weighted by the sector’s share of total capital factor demand. In the 
second step each sector’s share of the new capital investment (
a
f a t η ) is calculated by 
comparing its rental rate to the economy-wide average. For those sectors with above 
average rental rates, the second term on the right-hand side of Equation 67 will be greater 
than one. The converse would be true for sectors with rental rates that are below average. 
This term is then multiplied by the existing share of capital stock to arrive at a sectoral 
distribution for new capital. The intersectoral mobility of investment is indicated by 
a β . 
In the extreme case where 
a β  is zero there is no intersectoral mobility of investment 
funds, and all investment can be thought of as being funded by retained profits. Equation 
68 shows the third step of the updating procedure in which the quantity of new capital is 
calculated as the value of gross fixed capital formation divided by the price of capital 
( f t PK ). This is then multiplied by each sector’s share of new capital (
a
f a t η ) to arrive at a 
final quantity allocated to each sector (
a
f a t K Δ ). The determination of the unit capital 
price is shown in Equation 69. In the final step the new aggregate quantity of capital 
( 1 f t QFS + ) and the sectoral quantities of capital ( f a t+1 QF ) are adjusted from their previous 
levels to include new additions to the capital stock. Over and above these changes there is 
also a loss of capital to account for depreciation ( f υ ).  
Along with changes in factor supply, the dynamic model also considers changes 
in factor productivity. This is done by multiplying either the 
va
a α  parameter in Equation   91
26 by the percentage change in total factor productivity (TFP), or 
va
f a δ in the case of 
factor-specific productivity. Finally, government consumption spending and transfers to 
households, as well as foreign transfers, are fixed in real terms within a particular period 
it is necessary to exogenously increase these payments between periods. This is done by 
increasing the value of  c qg  in Equation 57 for government consumption spending, 
ig o v trnsfr  in Equation 58 for government transfers to households, and  ir o w trnsfr  in 
Equation 63 for foreign transfers. 
Finally, the model is linked to a household expenditure survey by taking 
endogenous changes in commodity consumption from each aggregate household and 
adjusting the level of expenditure for the corresponding disaggregated households in the 
survey. As the data used to calibrate the model (that is, social accounting matrix) is 
constructed using the survey data, there is a direct mapping between commodities and 
households in the model and survey. Therefore changes in  ch QH  from Equation 55 
(measured in base year prices) are used to update household expenditure in the survey. 
Standard poverty measures (including the poverty-growth elasticity) are then recalculated 
using the updated expenditure estimates and the unchanged poverty line.   92
Table A2.  CGE Model Sets, Parameters, and Variables 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Sets      
aA ∈   Activities  () cC M N C ∈ ⊂   Commodities not in CM 
() aA L E O A ∈⊂   Activities with a Leontief function 
at the top of the technology nest  () cC T C ∈ ⊂   Transaction service 
commodities 
cC ∈   Commodities  () cC X C ∈ ⊂   Commodities with 
domestic production  
() cC D C ∈⊂   Commodities with domestic sales 
of domestic output  f F ∈   Factors 
() cC D N C ∈⊂   Commodities not in CD  iI N S ∈  
Institutions (domestic and 
rest of world) 
() cC E C ∈⊂   Exported commodities   () i INSD INS ∈ ⊂   Domestic institutions 
() cC E N C ∈⊂   Commodities not in CE  () i INSDNG INSD ∈ ⊂   Domestic nongovernment 
institutions 
() cC M C ∈⊂   Aggregate imported commodities 
  () hH I N S D N G ∈ ⊂   Households 
Parameters      
c cwts   Weight of commodity c in the CPI  c qdst   Quantity of stock change 
c dwts   Weight of commodity c in the 
producer price index  c qg  
Base-year quantity of 
government demand 
ca ica   Quantity of c as intermediate input 
per unit of activity a  c qinv  
Base-year quantity of 
private investment 
demand 
' cc icd  
Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per unit of c’ produced and 
sold domestically 
if shif  
Share for domestic 
institution i in income of 
factor f 
' cc ice   Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per exported unit of c’  ' ii shii  
Share of net income of i’ 
to i (i’ ∈ INSDNG’; i ∈ 
INSDNG) 
' cc icm   Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per imported unit of c’   a ta   Tax rate for activity a 
a inta   Quantity of aggregate intermediate 
input per activity unit  i tins  
Exogenous direct tax rate 
for domestic institution i 
a iva   Quantity of aggregate intermediate 
input per activity unit  i tins01  
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with 
potentially flexed direct 
tax rates 
i mps  
Base savings rate for domestic 
institution i  c tm   Import tariff rate 
i mps01  
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially flexed 
direct tax rates 
c tq    Rate of sales tax 
c pwe   Export price (foreign currency)    if trnsfr   Transfer from factor f to 
institution i 
c pwm   Import price (foreign currency)       93
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Symbol Explanation  Symbol Explanation 
Greek Symbols    
a
a α   Efficiency parameter in the CES activity 
function 
t
c δ   CET function share parameter 
va
a α   Efficiency parameter in the CES value-
added function 
va
fa δ   CES value-added function share 
parameter for factor f in activity a 
ac
c α   Shift parameter for domestic commodity 
aggregation function 
m
ch γ   Subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
q
c α   Armington function shift parameter  ac θ   Yield of output c per unit of activity a 
t
c α   CET function shift parameter 
a
a ρ        CES production function exponent 
a β  
Capital sectoral mobility factor 
va
a ρ   CES value-added function exponent 
m
ch β  
Marginal share of consumption spending 
on marketed commodity c for household 
h 
ac
c ρ   Domestic commodity aggregation 
function exponent 
a
a δ   CES activity function share parameter 
q
c ρ   Armington function exponent 
ac
ac δ   Share parameter for domestic commodity 
aggregation function 
t
c ρ   CET function exponent 
q
c δ   Armington function share parameter 
a
fat η   Sector share of new capital 
f υ   Capital depreciation rate     
Exogenous Variables    
CPI   Consumer price index   MPSADJ Savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for base) 
DTINS  
Change in domestic institution tax share  
(= 0 for base; exogenous variable)  f QFS   Quantity supplied of factor 
FSAV    Foreign savings (FCU)  TINSADJ
Direct tax scaling factor (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
GADJ  
Government consumption adjustment 
factor  fa WFDIST
Wage distortion factor for factor f in 
activity a 
IADJ   Investment adjustment factor     
Endogenous Variables    
a
ft AWF  
Average capital rental rate in time period 
t  c QG   Government consumption demand for 
commodity 
DMPS  
Change in domestic institution savings 
rates (= 0 for base; exogenous variable)  ch QH   Quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h 
DPI  
Producer price index for domestically 
marketed output  ach QHA  
Quantity of household home 
consumption of commodity c from 
activity a for household h 
EG   Government expenditures  a QINTA   Quantity of aggregate intermediate input 
h EH   Consumption spending for household  ca QINT   Quantity of commodity c as intermediate 
input to activity a 
EXR  Exchange rate (LCU  per unit of FCU)  c QINV   Quantity of investment demand for 
commodity 
GSAV   Government savings  c QM   Quantity of imports of commodity c 
fa QF   Quantity demanded of factor f from 
activity a      94
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Symbol Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Endogenous Variables Continued    
i MPS  
Marginal propensity to save 
for domestic nongovernment 
institution (exogenous 
variable) 
c QQ  
Quantity of goods supplied to 
domestic market (composite 
supply) 
a PA   Activity price (unit gross 
revenue)  c QT    Quantity of commodity 
demanded as trade input 
c PDD  
Demand price for commodity 
produced and sold 
domestically 
a QVA   Quantity of (aggregate) 
value-added 
c PDS  
Supply price for commodity 
produced and sold 
domestically 
c QX  
Aggregated quantity of 
domestic output of 
commodity 
c PE   Export price (domestic 
currency)  ac QXAC    Quantity of output of 
commodity c from activity a 
a PINTA   Aggregate intermediate input 
price for activity a  f RWF   Real average factor price 
ft PK  
Unit price of capital in time 
period t   TABS   Total nominal absorption 
c PM   Import price (domestic 
currency)  i TINS   Direct tax rate for institution 
i (i ∈ INSDNG) 
c PQ   Composite commodity price  ' ii TRII   Transfers from institution i’ 
to i (both in the set INSDNG) 
a PVA   Value-added price (factor 
income per unit of activity)  f WF   Average price of factor 
c PX   Aggregate producer price for 
commodity  f YF   Income of factor f 
ac PXAC   Producer price of commodity 
c for activity a  YG   Government revenue 
a QA   Quantity (level) of activity  i YI   Income of domestic 
nongovernment institution 
c QD   Quantity sold domestically of 
domestic output  if YIF   Income to domestic 
institution i from factor f 
c QE   Quantity of exports 
a
fat K Δ   Quantity of new capital by 
activity a for time period t 
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Production and Price Equations   
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Institutional Incomes and Domestic Demand Equations   
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System Constraints and Macroeconomic Closures   
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Table A4.  Structure of Poverty and Production in Sub-Saharan Africa (1999) 




















Sub-Saharan Africa  42 865 50.7 100.0  100.0 63.5 29.3 28.0
Middle-income countries  8 2,996 26.4 7.8  0.8 49.8 8.4 42.6
         Botswana     4,130 22.0 0.3  0.1 50.6 2.4 46.7
         Cape Verde     1,550 27.3 0.1  0.0 36.7 11.0 16.8
         Equatorial Guinea     1,578 31.7 0.1  0.0 50.8 8.5 87.0
         Gabon     4,378 23.0 0.2  0.1 17.8 7.6 50.6
         Namibia     2,383 33.9 0.3  0.2 68.6 11.3 32.7
         Mauritius     4,352 5.0 0.2  0.0 58.4 6.3 31.2
         South Africa     4,068 2.0 6.6  0.2 42.4 3.2 31.2
         Swaziland     1,529 66.0 0.2  0.2 73.3 16.8 44.4
Low-income countries  34 363 56.4 92.2  99.2 66.7 34.2 24.5
   More favored agriculture  26 386 55.2 82.3  88.6 64.8 33.2 26.3
      Coastal countries 10 383 40.8 21.7  15.1 63.0 33.5 19.6
         Benin     424 16.4 1.0  0.3 57.0 35.5 14.4
         Cote d'Ivoire     715 13.5 2.5  0.6 56.0 24.3 21.6
         The Gambia     382 37.8 0.2  0.1 68.7 39.6 14.2
         Ghana     421 44.8 3.0  2.3 63.6 35.9 25.2
         Guinea-Bissau     206 84.2 0.2  0.3 67.7 56.2 12.7
         Kenya     325 23.9 4.7  1.9 65.7 19.0 18.2
         Mozambique     213 32.6 2.8  1.5 66.8 22.0 25.8
         Senegal     629 13.3 1.5  0.3 51.9 17.9 26.9
         Tanzania     197 78.3 5.2  7.0 66.8 44.8 15.8
         Togo     322 63.3 0.7  0.8 66.1 39.4 21.1  99
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      Landlocked countries  6 335 54.6 19.1  22.0 78.8 32.5 22.8
         Burkina Faso     250 57.0 1.8  1.7 83.1 38.2 20.7
         Ethiopia     121 85.2 10.0  14.6 84.1 52.3 11.1
         Lesotho     563 40.9 0.3  0.2 71.3 16.3 42.0
         Malawi     163 51.0 1.6  1.4 84.9 34.0 17.9
         Uganda     355 40.8 3.5  2.4 85.5 36.4 20.9
         Zimbabwe     559 52.4 2.0  1.7 64.0 17.6 24.4
      Mineral-rich countries  10 420 70.1 41.4  51.5 58.1 33.3 35.0
         Angola     525 72.2 2.1  2.5 65.2 8.0 66.8
         C.A. Rep.     696 40.0 2.3  1.6 50.3 42.7 19.6
         Cameroon     339 81.5 0.6  0.8 58.3 55.4 20.9
         D.R. Congo     85 92.4 7.9  12.5 60.0 56.3 18.8
         Rep. Congo     792 52.0 0.5  0.4 34.0 5.9 66.1
         Guinea     613 64.0 1.2  1.3 72.0 24.4 37.7
         Nigeria     257 67.6 19.8  22.8 55.1 29.5 46.0
         Sierra Leone     158 71.8 0.8  1.0 62.7 50.1 29.8
         Sudan     328 80.0 4.8  6.6 63.0 38.9 18.8
         Zambia     405 79.3 1.6  2.1 60.2 22.1 25.6
    Less-favored agriculture  8 289 60.1 9.9  10.6 73.2 37.4 18.9
         Comoros     433 55.5 0.1  0.1 66.2 40.9 11.1
         Madagascar     253 45.9 2.4  1.9 69.9 29.8 14.5
         Burundi     141 65.4 1.1  1.2 90.7 50.0 18.7
         Mali     292 71.7 1.7  2.1 69.1 37.8 26.4
         Rwanda     253 58.9 1.3  1.3 93.7 40.5 21.6
         Chad     230 81.8 1.2  1.7 75.8 38.6 13.7
         Mauritania     502 27.2 0.4  0.2 41.0 20.9 28.6
         Niger     208 74.5 1.7  2.2 78.9 40.4 16.9
Source: Own calculations using World Development Indicators (World Bank 2003a) and UNIDO (2004) for 1999 dollar-a-day poverty rates. 
Note: Simple averages were used thus treating all countries equally regardless of population. Five Sub-Saharan countries are excluded due to data-
limitations (Eritrea, Mayotte, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, and Somalia).   100
Table A5.  Growth Decomposition for African Countries (1985-1999) 
  Share of GDP (1999)    GDP growth rate (%)    Growth contribution (%)   
  Agric.  Ind.  Serv.  Agric.  Ind.  Serv.   Agric.  Ind.  Serv.  
GDP 
growth 
Sub-Saharan Africa  29.3  28.0 42.8   3.2 4.0  3.1   1.0 1.0 1.3     3.4 
Middle-income countries  8.4  42.6 49.0   2.7 8.4  5.7   0.4 3.1 2.8     6.3 
         Botswana  2.4  46.7 50.9   2.6 5.3  13.5   0.1 2.8 5.9     8.8 
         Cape Verde  11.0  16.8 72.2   3.8 5.0  5.0   0.5 1.0 3.3     4.8 
         Equatorial Guinea  8.5  87.0 4.6   4.3 33.0  8.5   1.9 11.7  1.7     15.4 
         Gabon  7.6  50.6 41.7   0.0 2.5  2.3   0.0 1.2 1.0     2.2 
         Namibia  11.3  32.7 55.9   4.7 2.2  3.7   0.5 0.7 2.1     3.3 
         Mauritius  6.3  31.2 62.5   1.4 7.7  6.2   0.2 2.5 3.5     6.1 
         South Africa  3.2  31.2 65.6   3.3 0.6  2.2   0.1 0.2 1.3     1.7 
         Swaziland  16.8  44.4 38.8   1.8 10.7  4.1   0.3 4.4 1.8     6.4 
Low-income countries  34.2  24.5 41.3   3.3 3.0  2.5   1.1 0.7 1.1     2.9 
   More-favored 
agriculture 33.2  26.3 40.5   3.2 3.1  2.4   1.1 0.8 1.0     2.9 
      Coastal countries  33.5  19.6 46.9   3.5 4.1  3.3   1.2 0.7 1.5     3.5 
         Benin  35.5  14.4 50.0   5.4 3.7  2.9   1.9 0.5 1.5     3.9 
         Cote d'Ivoire  24.3  21.6 54.1   2.9 4.1  1.1   0.8 0.9 0.6     2.3 
         The Gambia  39.6  14.2 46.2   3.0 5.4  3.2   0.9 0.7 1.8     3.4 
         Ghana  35.9  25.2 38.9   2.7 5.0  6.5   1.1 1.1 2.4     4.6 
         Guinea-Bissau  56.2  12.7 31.1   3.6 0.8  3.1   2.0 0.1 1.0     3.1 
         Kenya  19.0  18.2 62.9   2.0 2.8  3.8   0.6 0.5 2.0     3.1 
         Mozambique  22.0  25.8 52.2   4.6 7.9  6.2   1.7 1.6 2.7     6.0 
         Senegal  17.9  26.9 55.2   3.3 4.7  3.3   0.6 1.0 2.0     3.6 
         Tanzania  44.8  15.8 39.4   3.5 2.8  2.9   1.6 0.4 1.1     3.1 
         Togo  39.4  21.1 39.4   3.7 3.6  0.4   1.3 0.8 0.2     2.3 
      Landlocked countries  32.5  22.8 44.7   3.6 4.5  4.3   1.3 1.0 1.8     4.1 
         Burkina Faso  38.2  20.7 41.1   4.2 4.0  4.7   1.5 0.9 2.0     4.3 
         Ethiopia  52.3  11.1 36.5   2.7 1.8  4.9   1.5 0.2 1.7     3.4 
         Lesotho  16.3  42.0 41.7   2.1 8.3  4.3   0.4 2.6 2.1     5.1 
         Malawi  34.0  17.9 48.1   5.5 3.0  2.9   2.2 0.7 1.1     4.0 
         Uganda  36.4  20.9 42.8   3.5 9.0  6.1   1.7 1.3 2.2     5.2 
         Zimbabwe  17.6  24.4 57.9   3.4 1.1  2.7   0.6 0.3 1.4     2.3   101
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  Share of GDP (1999)    GDP growth rate (%)    Growth contribution (%)   
  Agric.  Ind.  Serv.  Agric.  Ind.  Serv.   Agric.  Ind.  Serv.  
GDP 
growth 
      Mineral-rich countries  33.3 35.0 31.7   2.8 1.3  0.4   0.8 0.4 0.2     1.4 
         Angola  8.0 66.8 25.3   1.3 3.9  -0.4   0.2 2.1  -0.1     2.1 
         C.A. Rep.  55.4 20.9 23.7   2.8 1.2  -0.9   1.4 0.2  -0.3     1.3 
         Cameroon  42.7 19.6 37.7   3.7 -0.1  -0.5   1.2 0.0  -0.2     1.0 
         D.R. Congo  56.3 18.8 24.9   1.1 -6.1  -7.0   0.5 -1.4 -2.4     -3.3 
         Rep. Congo  5.9 66.1 28.0   2.2 2.0  0.0   0.2 0.9 0.0     1.2 
         Guinea  24.4 37.7 37.9   4.1 3.6  3.2   1.0 1.2 1.4     3.5 
         Nigeria  29.5 46.0 24.5   4.7 2.5  4.9   1.5 1.0 1.2     3.8 
         Sierra Leone  50.1 29.8 20.1   -3.5 -0.1  -1.2   -1.5 0.0  -0.4      -2.0 
         Sudan  38.9 18.8 42.4   6.6 6.0  4.1   2.6 1.0 1.8     5.4 
         Zambia  22.1 25.6 52.3   4.5 -0.3  2.2   0.9 -0.1  0.9      1.7 
    Less favored agriculture  37.4 18.9 43.7   3.5 2.7  2.6   1.3 0.5 1.2     3.0 
         Comoros  40.9 11.1 48.0   3.4 3.7  -1.0   1.3 0.4  -0.5     1.2 
         Madagascar  29.8 14.5 55.7   2.2 2.6  2.5   0.7 0.3 1.4     2.4 
         Burundi  50.0 18.7 31.3   1.4 0.8  1.8   0.8 0.2 0.5     1.4 
         Mali  37.8 26.4 35.9   4.1 6.8  2.1   1.8 1.2 0.8     3.8 
         Rwanda  40.5 21.6 37.9   3.2 1.8  3.7   1.3 0.3 1.5     3.1 
         Chad  38.6 13.7 47.7   5.8 3.3  3.8   2.1 0.5 1.9     4.4 
         Mauritania  20.9 28.6 50.5   3.9 2.6  4.5   1.0 0.8 1.9     3.8 
         Niger  40.4 16.9 42.7   3.7 0.3  3.6   1.4 0.0 1.6     3.1 
Source: Own calculations using World Development Indicators (World Bank 2003a). 
Note: Aggregations across countries are simple averages rather than GDP weighted averages. Although average GDP shares for 1985-01 were used for 
decomposition, only the share for 2001 is shown in order to remain consistent with other tables. Agric. is agriculture; Ind. is industry; and Serv. is 
services. 
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